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Theories of Prosecution
Jeffrey Bellin*
For decades, legal commentators sounded the alarm about the
tremendous power wielded by prosecutors. Scholars went so far as to
identify uncurbed prosecutorial discretion as the primary source of the
criminal justice system’s many flaws. Over the past two years,
however, the conversation shifted. With the emergence of a new wave
of “progressive prosecutors,” scholars increasingly hail broad
prosecutorial discretion as a promising mechanism for criminal
justice reform.
The abrupt shift from decrying to embracing prosecutorial power
highlights a curious void at the center of criminal justice thought.
There is no widely accepted normative theory of the prosecutorial role.
As a result, prosecutors are viewed as the criminal justice system’s
free agents, deploying the powers of their offices as they see fit to serve
constituents, public safety, or, most broadly, the cause of justice.
This Article uses the rapidly shifting views about prosecutors to
explore normative theories of prosecution: What should prosecutors
be doing? It highlights the emptiness of the current “do justice” model
and proposes an alternative “servant-of-the-law” theory of
prosecutorial behavior that could place real constraints on
prosecutorial excess. It also explores ways in which a servant-of-thelaw model could, perhaps counterintuitively, contribute much-needed
theoretical grounding to the progressive prosecution movement.
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INTRODUCTION
Scholars view prosecutors as “the most powerful officials in the criminal
justice system,”1 and blame them for “[m]uch of what is wrong with American
criminal justice.”2 But there is typically something missing from the accounts.
An abundant literature highlights the failings of the nation’s prosecutors.3 Yet
when it comes to setting out principles to govern how prosecutors should act, the
commentary offers only platitudes.4 A 1935 Supreme Court opinion famously
reminds prosecutors that it is their special duty to ensure “that justice shall be
done.”5 After that, the consensus crumbles. Despite all the attention paid to
prosecutors in recent years, the primary guidance on the prosecutorial function
remains a timeworn Rorschach test.6

1. ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 5
(2007); see also Adam M. Gershowitz, Consolidating Local Criminal Justice: Should Prosecutors
Control the Jails?, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 677, 677–78 (2016) (“No serious observer disputes that
prosecutors . . . hold most of the power in the United States criminal justice system.”).
2. David Alan Sklansky, The Nature and Function of Prosecutorial Power, 106 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 473, 474 (2016) (“Much of what is wrong with American criminal justice—its racial
inequity, its excessive severity, its propensity for error—is increasingly blamed on prosecutors.”). For a
critique of this critique, see Jeffrey Bellin, The Power of Prosecutors, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 171 (2019).
3. See Shima Baradaran Baughman, Subconstitutional Checks, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1071,
1076 (2017) (coining the phrase “the Prosecutor Problem” to describe “what modern scholars claim is
responsible for the astronomical increase in incarceration in America in the last fifty years”); Jeffrey
Bellin, Reassessing Prosecutorial Power Through the Lens of Mass Incarceration, 116 MICH. L. REV.
835, 837 (2018) (book review) (“Prosecutors are the Darth Vader of academic writing: mysterious,
powerful and, for the most part, bad.”); Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Prosecutorial Neutrality,
2004 WIS. L. REV. 837, 845–46 (2004) (“[P]rosecutors have been criticized for bringing cases that are
too weak or poorly investigated, for bringing prosecutions that are unduly harsh, and for other purported
excesses.”); William T. Pizzi, Understanding Prosecutorial Discretion in the United States: The Limits
of Comparative Criminal Procedure as an Instrument of Reform, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 1325, 1329 (1993)
(“The American prosecutor has been under nearly constant attack in the criminal procedure
literature . . . .”).
4. See Stanley Z. Fisher, In Search of the Virtuous Prosecutor: A Conceptual Framework, 15
AM. J. CRIM. L. 197, 201 (1988) (“Discussions of prosecutorial duty in the literature tend to remain
either on the level of broad platitudes or, when addressed to particular practices, to lack a coherent
framework.”); Green & Zacharias, supra note 3, at 840 (“Commentators need to be more precise about
what they expect of prosecutors . . . .”); infra notes 19–26 and accompanying text.
5. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
6. See infra notes 19–26 and accompanying text.
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Commentators traditionally viewed the absence of concrete rules governing
prosecutorial discretion as a blight on the criminal justice landscape, contributing
to overly punitive and often racist criminal justice outcomes.7 Yet in recent years,
with the ascension of unapologetically “progressive prosecutors,” commentary
on prosecutorial power developed a new dimension.8 In 2017, for example,
newly elected Orlando District Attorney Aramis Ayala announced that her office
would no longer seek the death penalty.9 Over one hundred prominent law
professors and public officials signed an open letter of support. Efforts to
override Ayala’s decision, they wrote, threatened prosecutors’ “extremely broad
discretion to decide when, and how, to prosecute” and “compromise[d] the
prosecutorial independence upon which the criminal justice system depends.”10
Around the same time, Baltimore’s chief prosecutor, Marilyn Mosby, became a
“proxy for a nation reeling with outrage and disbelief” when she swiftly initiated
ultimately unsuccessful criminal charges against six police officers involved in
the death of Freddie Gray.11 In a “clip that would echo across the country,”
Mosby explained to supporters, “I have heard your calls for ‘no justice, no

7. See Davis, supra note 1, at 17 (“[E]veryday, legal exercise of prosecutorial discretion is
largely responsible for the tremendous injustices in our criminal justice system.”); Kenneth B. Nunn,
The “Darden Dilemma”: Should African Americans Prosecute Crimes?, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1473,
1492 (2000) (“Arguably, the overrepresentation of African Americans in the criminal justice system is
due largely to the actions of prosecutors.”); Steven Alan Reiss, Prosecutorial Intent in Constitutional
Criminal Procedure, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1365, 1477 (1987) (“It is, however, precisely because
prosecutors wield so much power that the restraints which limit exercise of that power must be more
discernable and objective.”); James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L.
REV. 1521, 1572 (1981) (“[E]nvision[ing] a system in which prosecutors have far less power than they
have today.”).
8. Deborah Tuerkheimer, Criminal Justice and the Mattering of Lives, 116 MICH. L. REV.
1145, 1165 (2018) (book review) (calling on prosecutors in this “new era of prosecution” to “recast the
pursuit of criminal justice as an antisubordination mandate” and “transform the very meaning of criminal
justice”); Collier Meyerson, Prosecutors Keep Their Jobs by Putting People in Jail. Can They Be
Leaders in the Fight for Criminal-Justice Reform?, NATION (Nov. 14, 2017),
https://www.thenation.com/article/prosecutors-keep-their-jobs-by-putting-people-in-jail-can-they-beleaders-in-the-fight-for-criminal-justice-reform/ [https://perma.cc/L472-D66S] (“Recently, a rash of
self-proclaimed progressive prosecutors have made public moves toward reform.”); Editorial, A Wiser
Generation
of
Prosecutors,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Feb.
6,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/06/opinion/a-wiser-generation-of-prosecutors.html
[https://perma.cc/T9YK-H6ZH] (hailing rise of “[r]eformist prosecutors”).
9. See Ayala v. Scott, 224 So. 3d 755, 756 (Fla. 2017) (describing controversy); see also Kyle
Clark, New DA McCann Says Denver is Done with the Death Penalty, 9NEWS.COM (Jan. 10, 2017),
http://www.9news.com/article/news/local/next/new-da-mccann-says-denver-is-done-with-the-deathpenalty/384633301 [https://perma.cc/5ZD6-RF8Y] (reporting on Denver’s chief prosecutor: “I don’t
think that the state should be in the business of killing people.”).
10. Statement from Current or Former Judges, Prosecutors, and Law Professors Requesting
Reversal of Decision to Remove Ayala from the Markeith Loyd Prosecution, NAT’L BLACK
PROSECUTORS
ASS’N
(Mar.
27,
2017),
http://www.blackprosecutors.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/03/342443894-FloridaSign-OnLetter.pdf [https://perma.cc/FCX7-FFWP].
11. Wil S. Hylton, Baltimore vs. Marilyn Mosby, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Sept. 28, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/02/magazine/marilyn-mosby-freddie-gray-baltimore.html
[https://perma.cc/W7W7-ZUWY].
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peace!’”12 Most recently, Mosby, along with other big-city prosecutors like
District Attorneys Larry Krasner (Philadelphia) and Cyrus Vance (Manhattan)
announced that their offices would no longer enforce marijuana possession
laws.13 Krasner explained the decision as “the right thing to do”; Vance’s stated
goal was “to reduce inequality and unnecessary interactions with the criminal
justice system.”14 Mosby highlighted the laws’ ineffectiveness: “When I ask
myself: Is the enforcement and prosecution of marijuana possession making us
safer as a city? [T]he answer is emphatically ‘no.’”15
These prosecutors are not aberrations. They are prominent representatives
of a national movement to leverage prosecutorial power to achieve criminal
justice reform.16 A recent New York Times editorial captures the excitement,
embracing the new wave of “state and local prosecutors who are open to
rethinking how they do their enormously influential jobs.”17 In light of legislative
obstacles, the Times editorialized, this “wiser generation” of prosecutors is “the

12. Id.; Page Croyder, Police Charges in Freddie Gray Case Are Incompetent at Best, BALT.
SUN (May 5, 2015), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/oped/bs-ed-freddie-gray-mosby20150505-story.html [https://perma.cc/8D54-KFTD] (criticizing Mosby’s decision to charge the
officers).
13. PHILADELPHIA DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, NEW POLICIES ANNOUNCED FEBRUARY
15, 2018, https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/4412996/Krasner-Memo-March-13-2018.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6MRD-46ZJ]; Manhattan District Attorney’s Office, District Attorney Vance to End
the Prosecution of Marijuana Possession and Smoking Cases, (May 15, 2018),
https://www.manhattanda.org/district-attorney-vance-to-end-the-prosecution-of-marijuana-possessionand-smoking-cases/ [https://perma.cc/3DUE-CVL3]; Tim Prudente, Baltimore Will Stop Prosecuting
Marijuana
Possession,
Mosby
Announces,
BALT.
SUN
(Jan.
30,
2019),
https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/crime/bs-md-mosby-marijuana-prosecution-policy20190129-story.html [https://perma.cc/DV7F-LSVN].
14. Manhattan District Attorney’s Office, supra note 13; Brian X. McCrone, Marijuana
Criminal Cases Dropped En Masse by Philadelphia District Attorney, NBC PHILA. (Feb. 15, 2018),
https://www.nbcphiladelphia.com/news/local/Marijuana-Criminal-Cases-Dropped-En-Masse-byPhiladelphia-District-Attorney-Larry-Krasner-474228023.html [https://perma.cc/4JAV-ZKBU] (“‘I
did it because I felt it was the right thing to do,’ Krasner said. ‘We could use those resources to solve
homicides.’”).
15. Prudente, supra note 13.
16. See Emily Bazelon & Miriam Krinsky, There’s a Wave of New Prosecutors. And They Mean
Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 11, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/11/opinion/how-localprosecutors-can-reform-their-justice-systems.html [https://perma.cc/79H7-9YRZ] (“In the past two
years, a wave of prosecutors promising less incarceration and more fairness have been elected across
the country.”); Scott Bland, George Soros’ Quiet Overhaul of the U.S. Justice System, POLITICO (Aug.
30, 2016), https://www.politico.com/story/2016/08/george-soros-criminal-justice-reform-227519
[https://perma.cc/3GUZ-EETJ] (chronicling reform movement); Christopher Connelly, National
Advocacy Groups Back Candidates To Challenge Local Prosecutors, NPR (Apr. 10, 2018),
https://www.npr.org/2018/04/10/598440346/national-advocacy-groups-back-candidates-to-challengelocal-prosecutors [https://perma.cc/8FAQ-KJGS]; Henry Gass, Meet a New Breed of Prosecutor,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (July 17, 2017), https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2017/0717/Meeta-new-breed-of-prosecutor [https://perma.cc/ZKE6-ZNHQ]; Jon Schuppe, Criminal Justice Reformers
Aim Big by Targeting Local DA Races, NBC (Feb. 14, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/usnews/criminal-justice-reformers-aim-big-targeting-local-da-races-n847436 [https://perma.cc/RYX9HGV5].
17. Editorial, supra note 8.
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best chance for continued reform.”18 These developments bring renewed urgency
to a long-unanswered question: What is the role of the American prosecutor?
Given the centrality of prosecutors to academic writing of the past decade, the
lack of an answer is striking.
The curious absence of a normative theory of prosecutorial behavior is best
explained by the runaway success of the vacuous ideal that reigns in its place.
The conventional view of the prosecutorial role derives from an iconic passage
in Berger v. United States.19 There, a unanimous Supreme Court rebuked a
prosecutor who made “improper insinuations and assertions calculated to
mislead the jury.”20 A prosecutor, the Court explained, represents “a sovereignty
whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to
govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that
it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.”21
Although earlier statements to similar effect can be found,22 jurists,
attorneys, and commentators seize upon the Berger passage as “the most
authoritative and eloquent description in U.S. law of the role of the prosecutor in
administering criminal justice.”23 The American Bar Association (ABA) adopts
this formulation (and little else) in its Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
instructing prosecutors to act as “minister[s] of justice.”24 The largest association
of state prosecutors, the National District Attorneys Association (NDAA),
similarly describes the prosecutor as “an independent administrator of justice.”25
Following these organizations’ lead, the “legal profession has left much of a
18. Id.; see also Joseph Neff, How Prosecutor Reform is Shaking Up Small DA Races, THE
MARSHALL PROJECT (May 1, 2018), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2018/05/01/how-prosecutorreform-is-shaking-up-small-da-races [https://perma.cc/6CXT-RGUV] (highlighting “a new breed of
prosecutors” elected across the country, often with “outside help” from progressive sources).
19. 295 U.S. 78 (1935).
20. Id. at 85.
21. Id. at 88.
22. See, e.g., Hurd v. People, 25 Mich. 405, 416 (1872) (“The prosecuting officer represents the
public interest . . . . His object, like that of the court, should be simply justice . . . .”); Eric S. Fish, Against
Adversary Prosecution, 103 IOWA L. REV. 1419, 1438 (2018) (collecting other examples).
23. Bennett L. Gershman, “Hard Strikes and Foul Blows:” Berger v. United States 75 Years
After, 42 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 177, 196 (2010); see Fish, supra note 22, at 1426 (describing Berger passage
as the “most commonly cited” of the “canonical statements” of prosecutor’s role); Bennett L. Gershman,
The Prosecutor’s Duty to Truth, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 309, 317 (2001) (describing Berger as the
“seminal case defining the prosecutor’s legal and ethical role as a minister of justice”); Michael A.
Simons, Prosecutors as Punishment Theorists: Seeking Sentencing Justice, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV.
303 (2009) (“It is a truism that prosecutors are called not just to win, not just to zealously represent their
clients, but rather to ‘seek justice.’”); Sklansky, supra note 2, at 479 (describing Berger as a “hallowed
text[]”). A recent Westlaw search reveals that Berger’s exhortation is quoted in over one thousand
judicial opinions and seven hundred secondary sources.
24. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8 cmt. (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019) (“A prosecutor has
the responsibility of a minister of justice . . . .”).
25. NAT’L DIST. ATTORNEYS ASS’N, NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS pt. 1-1.1 (3d ed.
2009),
https://ndaa.org/wp-content/uploads/NDAA-NPS-3rd-Ed.-w-Revised-Commentary.pdf
[https://perma.cc/D9R2-F3FN] (“The primary responsibility of a prosecutor is to seek justice . . . .”);
Robert Rubinson, Professional Identity As Advocacy, 31 MISS. C. L. REV. 7, 30 (2012) (characterizing
the NDAA as “the preeminent national organization for state prosecutors”).
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prosecutor’s day-to-day decisionmaking unregulated, in favor of this catch-all
‘seek justice’ admonition.”26
It is hard to object to Berger’s iconic description of prosecutors. No one
can deny the appeal of justice, Merriam-Webster’s 2018 “word of the year.”27
Federal prosecutors work in the “Department of Justice.”28 Superheroes operate
out of the “Hall of Justice.”29 School children pledge allegiance to a nation
dedicated to “justice for all.”30 It’s a great slogan. The problem is that
philosophers have been trying to define “justice” for thousands of years and
report little progress.31 John Stuart Mill considered justice to be a placeholder
for other considerations, which explained why “so many things appear either just
or unjust, according to the light in which they are regarded.”32 This observation
becomes particularly salient in the grey landscapes of the criminal law, where
justice has little uncontested content. Reformers urge prosecutors to seek justice
by dispensing mercy,33 while their opponents wield the same slogan to endorse
severity.34 As Abbe Smith points out: “The concept could not be more
ambiguous and subject to multiple interpretations.”35 Other commentators pile
on: “When the ABA advises prosecutors to act as ‘ministers of justice’ or

26. R. Michael Cassidy, Character and Context: What Virtue Theory Can Teach Us About a
Prosecutor’s Ethical Duty to “Seek Justice,” 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 635, 637 (2006); see also Daniel
S. Medwed, The Prosecutor as Minister of Justice: Preaching to the Unconverted from the PostConviction Pulpit, 84 WASH. L. REV. 35, 43 (2009) (“[T]his absence of guidance has left tough ethical
questions largely in the hands of trial prosecutors alone.”); Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of
Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45, 58 (1991) (“The
framework that the drafters have chosen consists primarily of the ‘do justice’ rule.”)
27. ‘Justice’ is Merriam-Webster’s 2018 Word Of The Year, NPR (Dec. 17, 2018),
https://www.npr.org/2018/12/17/677300083/justice-is-merriam-websters-2018-word-of-the-year
[https://perma.cc/T5SX-WPUW]; MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S WORD OF THE YEAR 2018 (2018),
https://www.merriam-webster.com/words-at-play/word-of-the-year-2018-justice
[https://perma.cc/G5QW-TUN8] (noting that despite a lack of clarity about its content, “justice has been
on the minds of many people in 2018”).
28. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/ [https://perma.cc/4V2Y-AL7Y].
29. See
Hall
of
Justice
(comics),
WIKIPEDIA
(Sept.
20,
2019),
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hall_of_Justice_(comics) [https://perma.cc/26NR-AZA8] (“The Hall of
Justice . . . is a fictional headquarters appearing in American comic books published by DC Comics.
The Hall of Justice serves as a headquarters for the Justice League.”).
30. The Pledge of Allegiance, USHISTORY, http://www.ushistory.org/documents/pledge.htm
[https://perma.cc/FX7C-F457].
31. See generally OTTO A. BIRD, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE (1967) (collecting commentary).
32. J. S. MILL, UTILITARIANISM 99 (Roger Crisp ed., 1998).
33. See, e.g., Angela J. Davis, The Prosecutor’s Ethical Duty to End Mass Incarceration, 44
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1063, 1081 (2016) (arguing that the prosecutor’s duty to do justice “could be fulfilled
by working to reduce mass incarceration through the expanded use of diversion and clemency
programs”).
34. See, e.g., Nat’l Dist. Attorney’s Ass’n, Message from the President: A Sense of Who We
Are, 34 THE PROSECUTOR 5, 5 (Sept./Oct. 2000) (explaining that a prosecutor’s responsibility “to
accomplish justice” is “commonly understood” as a directive “to zealously pursue a conviction and then
to seek the most severe sentence allowed by law”).
35. Abbe Smith, Can You Be a Good Person and a Good Prosecutor?, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 355, 377 (2001).
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‘administrators of justice,’ it is using juris-babble that is practically meaningless
to prosecutors and to the ABA itself.”36
Scholars traditionally sought to temper prosecutors’ broad discretion to “do
justice” through calls for regulation. In fact, the scarcity of rules governing
prosecutorial decisions is a central criminal justice lament.37 Commentators
often cite a lack of “political will” to regulate these powerful actors,38 but
disagreement about what prosecutorial regulations should say is an equally
compelling explanation. As David Sklansky wryly points out, “[u]nless they are
co-authors, no two scholars ever propose the same metric for prosecutorial
effectiveness.”39
Most entries in the academic literature about prosecutors fit comfortably
within a familiar debate between rules and standards. Some commentators seek
to rein in prosecutorial discretion with strict rules.40 Others disagree, contending
that the multifaceted and fact-bound prosecutorial function requires malleable
standards.41 There is a lively derivative discussion about whether new rules (or
standards) should be operationalized through judicial oversight, legislative
action, ethics boards, or internal guidelines.42 These are important questions. A
36. Kenneth Bresler, Pretty Phrases: The Prosecutor As Minister of Justice and Administrator
of Justice, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1301, 1301 (1996).
37. See Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial Accountability, 157
U. PA. L. REV. 959, 962 (2009) (“Many, if not most, other government actors enjoy less power yet are
subject to far more regulation than prosecutors are.”); Steven Alan Reiss, Prosecutorial Intent in
Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1365, 1365 (1987) (“Few officials can so affect
the lives of others as can prosecutors. Yet few operate in a vacuum so devoid of externally enforceable
constraints.”).
38. See, e.g., Bruce A. Green, Prosecutorial Ethics in Retrospect, 30 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
461, 462 (2017) (pointing to prosecutors’ “political clout” as an obstacle to reform); Niki Kuckes, The
State of Rule 3.8: Prosecutorial Ethics Reform Since Ethics 2000, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 427, 433
(2009) (criticizing “the ABA’s seeming lack of political will to tackle prosecutorial ethics”); Nirej
Sekhon, The Pedagogical Prosecutor, 44 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 45 (2014) (decrying “absence of
political will to regulate prosecutors”).
39. See Sklansky, supra note 2, at 516.
40. See Erik Luna & Marianne Wade, Prosecutors as Judges, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1413,
1417 (2010) (“[A]cademic solutions to the problems of prosecutorial discretion came in two forms: the
promulgation of internal office guidelines to control prosecutorial decision-making and the development
of external limitations through restrictive legislation or heightened judicial review.”); Robert P.
Mosteller, The Duke Lacrosse Case, Innocence, and False Identifications: A Fundamental Failure to
“Do Justice,” 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1337, 1341 (2007) (emphasizing “the need for concrete rules”).
41. See Bresler, supra note 36, at 1305 (suggesting that rule makers should “[s]tick with the
mission for prosecutors — to seek justice” because “[i]t probably cannot be described more
eloquently”); Cassidy, supra note 26, at 640 (“Any attempt to regulate how prosecutors should ‘act’ in
certain highly contextualized and nuanced situations by developing more specific normative rules is
unworkable.”); Nat’l Dist. Attorney’s Ass’n, supra note 34, at 6 (“A subjective sense of justice is
fundamental to a good prosecutor.”).
42. JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION—AND HOW TO
ACHIEVE REAL REFORM 210-11 (2017) (suggesting legislative plea bargaining guidelines); Bibas, supra
note 37 (“While many scholars discuss prosecutorial discretion as a problem, most favor external
regulation of prosecutors by other institutions.”); Luna & Wade, supra note 40, at 1417 (summarizing
the debate between proponents of external control and supporters of internal guidelines); Medwed, supra
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central contention of this Article, however, is that all sides of the debate skip an
essential step. Whether we think prosecutors should be governed by rules or
standards, and regardless of where we think those commands should originate,
we must begin with a normative principle. That principle could either generate
standards to govern prosecutorial discretion, or it could provide a starting point
from which to derive enforceable rules. Right now, the starting point (“justice”)
is an analytical dead end. It offers neither a meaningful standard to govern
prosecutors, nor a useful guideline for generating specific rules. This core
theoretical failing, more than any other factor, explains why academics, judges,
and practitioners have made so little progress articulating concrete guidance for
prosecutorial behavior.43
The problems go beyond accountability. Without a clear consensus about
what to expect of prosecutors, legislators struggle to maintain the appropriate
balance in the criminal law. Prosecutor offices are populated by a wide variety
of attorneys, over twenty-five thousand of them,44 all doing their own justice
thing.45 Even individual prosecutors may oscillate in their assessment of what
approach best serves justice, depending on the suspected crime or characteristics
of the offender. If each prosecutor pursues justice as they see it, the same law
will be too lenient in one county and too severe in another.46 Capital punishment
presents the most extreme example, with the likelihood of a death sentence

note 26, at 43–44 ( “Some commentators press for more stringent rules . . . ; others recommend increased
training for prosecutors in rendering ethical decisions; and still others suggest . . . ‘a renewed focus’ on
virtuous conduct.”); Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, The Duty to Avoid Wrongful Convictions: A
Thought Experiment in the Regulation of Prosecutors, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1, 5 (2009) (proposing stronger
ethics regulation).
43. Leslie C. Griffin, The Prudent Prosecutor, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 259, 307 (2001)
(“Discussions of prosecutorial discretion . . . show much confusion about what [good judgment] is, and
what mix of moral and legal reasoning enhances it.”); M. Elaine Nugent-Borakove, Performance
Measures and Accountability, in THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 91, 93 (John
L. Worrall & M. Elaine Nugent-Borakove eds., 2008) (“A central problem in the attempt to define
performance measures in prosecution is the lack of a clear definition of prosecutorial goals and
objectives.”); Sklansky, supra note 2, at 480 (“[T]he absence of coherent aspirations may go a long way
toward explaining the dearth of meaningful rules.”).
44. Steve W. Perry & Duren Banks, Prosecutors in State Courts, 2007 – Statistical Tables,
BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. 2 (DEC. 2011), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/psc07st.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6GNZ-4RRU] (“The nearly 25,000 FTE assistant prosecutors employed in 2007
represented a 7% increase from the number reported in 2001 . . . .”).
45. See Roy B. Flemming, The Political Styles and Organizational Strategies of American
Prosecutors: Examples from Nine Courthouse Communities, 12 L. & POL’Y 25 (1990) (chronicling
varying approaches of chief prosecutors).
46. See William T. Pizzi, Understanding Prosecutorial Discretion in the United States: The
Limits of Comparative Criminal Procedure as an Instrument of Reform, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 1325, 1344
(1993) (“[T]wo prosecutorial offices in the same state will treat the possession of a small amount of
cocaine, a first time property offense, or drunk driving differently.”).
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depending as much on the prosecutor overseeing the case as the characteristics
of the crime.47
There is, then, a strong case for developing a normative theory of the
prosecutorial role. But what? There are numerous justice themes that prosecutors
invoke in the course of their duties: public safety (“tough justice”), serving
constituents (“popular justice”), and, most recently, ending mass incarceration
(“social justice”).48 But these rhetorical appeals are typically too indeterminate
to generate concrete guidance for prosecutors deciding whether to initiate and
how to pursue specific cases.49 The law is the most likely place to look for this
kind of guidance—and prosecutors sometimes invoke their adherence to the law
to explain unpopular decisions.50 Yet scholars vigorously resist such an
approach, urging prosecutors to exercise their discretion when necessary to
sidestep the law’s commands.51 Closely tying prosecutorial discretion to
substantive law, they contend, will result in wooden formalism and needless
severity.52 These are all good points. But they undergird a hard bargain. Our long
experiment with justice as the prosecutorial touchstone has not produced an
abundance of leniency or, in the eyes of many commentators, justice. And given
the widely recognized dangers of unbridled prosecutorial discretion, it seems
worthwhile to explore alternatives.
This Article explores the possibility of using existing legal rules to
construct a coherent normative theory of prosecution—and primarily state and

47. See Katherine Barnes et al., Place Matters (Most): An Empirical Study of Prosecutorial
Decision-Making in Death-Eligible Cases, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 305, 360 (2009) (highlighting “large
geographic disparities in the rates of . . . death penalty prosecutions and convictions”); Adam M.
Gershowitz, Pay Now, Execute Later: Why Counties Should Be Required to Post a Bond to Seek the
Death Penalty, 41 U. RICH. L. REV. 861, 862–63 (2007) (noting that while most Texas counties hadn’t
had a death penalty prosecution in decades, Harris County prosecutors “sought the death penalty more
than a dozen times per year,” a pattern repeated in Philadelphia, Cook County, and “throughout the
country”).
48. See Connelly, supra note 16 (“social justice”).
49. See infra Part II.
50. See, e.g., Sarah Fearing, ‘Oath to Uphold the Law’: Historic Triangle Prosecutors Plan No
Change in Handling Marijuana Cases, WY DAILY (Jan. 16, 2019), https://wydaily.com/localnews/2019/01/16/oath-to-uphold-the-law-historic-triangle-prosecutors-plan-no-change-in-handlingmarijuana-cases/ [https://perma.cc/9E8T-TNQ5] (quoting prosecutors’ explanation for why they would
continue to prosecute marijuana cases); Press Release, Cal. Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Kamala
D. Harris Issues Statement on Appeal of Court Ruling on California’s Death Penalty (Aug. 21, 2014),
https://oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/attorney-general-kamala-d-harris-issues-statement-appealcourt-ruling-california [https://perma.cc/SZC3-9L5V] (explaining decision to defend death penalty
law).
51. See, e.g., Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision Not
to Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1665 (2010) (describing such an approach as suitable only for
“an imaginary state of affairs that is almost wholly contrary to the qualities that typify modern American
criminal justice”); Fish, supra note 22, at 1423 (“[T]he American system gives prosecutors too much
discretion for them to act as morally neutral bureaucrats at every stage of the criminal justice process.”).
52. See, e.g., Barbara McQuade, Smart on Crime Charging Policy Provides Roadmap for More
Effective Criminal Justice Strategy, 30 FED. SENT’G. REP. 207, 208 (2018) (critiquing policy of “strict
application of the statute”); Bowers, supra note 51; Fish, supra note 22, at 1423.
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local prosecution, the locus of American criminal law.53 It crafts a “servant-ofthe-law” model of prosecution that takes its name from an undeveloped intuition
expressed in the same Supreme Court opinion that tasks prosecutors with
ensuring “that justice shall be done.” There, the Court also emphasized that the
prosecutor is “in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law.”54
Parallels can be drawn to the perception of prosecutors in continental Europe,
although those legal systems are so distinct that isolated comparisons of the
prosecutorial function tend to obscure rather than clarify.55 The Article retains a
domestic focus, explaining how a servant-of-the-law orientation would change
American prosecutorial behavior. In so doing, it highlights potential benefits for
our criminal justice system of shifting the dominant conception of the
prosecutorial role from an “advocate for justice”56 to a “servant of the law.”
Perhaps the greatest benefit is determinacy. By stripping away any pretense that
prosecutors possess sweeping responsibility for justice, a servant-of-the-law
model lays the groundwork for both overarching principles and concrete
guidance for how prosecutors best serve the law in specific situations.57
Serving the law is a clearer assignment than seeking justice. But it is by no
means easy. Prosecutors will always be torn by competing tensions, as is the law.
This tension could lead to an equanimity of purpose rather than the adversarial
mindset at the root of modern prosecutorial excess.58 The law criminalizes
certain conduct and sets penalty ranges upon conviction. But the law also dictates
a process by which convictions must be obtained, including a heavy burden of

53. See Darryl K. Brown, Prosecutors and Overcriminalization: Thoughts on Political
Dynamics and a Doctrinal Response, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 453, 453 (2009) (“Criminal law is
overwhelmingly state law . . . .”); Susan R. Klein & Ingrid B. Grobey, Debunking Claims of OverFederalization of Criminal Law, 62 EMORY L.J. 1, 7 (2012) (“The action in criminal law has always
been, and continues to be, at the state and local levels.”).
54. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935); cf. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (setting out the
executive’s constitutional duty to ensure the laws are “faithfully executed”); Donnelly v. DeChristoforo,
416 U.S. 637, 648–49 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“The function of the prosecutor . . . is to vindicate
the right of people as expressed in the laws and give those accused of crime a fair trial.”); Robert H.
Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 31 J. CRIM. LAW & CRIMINOLOGY 3, 6 (1940) (“[T]he citizen’s safety
lies in the prosecutor who . . . serves the law and not factional purposes . . . .”).
55. See KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 194
(1969) (commenting favorably on the German prosecution model); Sklansky, supra note 2, at 493–94
(discussing traditional differences between American and European prosecutors, but noting modern
convergence); Thomas Weigend & Jenia Iontcheva Turner, The Constitutionality of Negotiated
Criminal Judgments in Germany, 15 GERMAN L.J. 81, 101–02 (2014) (discussing constraints on
German prosecutors and implications for plea bargaining).
56. United States v. Wilson, 578 F.2d 67, 71 (5th Cir. 1978) (“The prosecutor must be an
advocate for Justice.”)
57. See infra Part II.
58. See Wilson, 578 F.2d at 71 (“Caught up in the adversary process and the emotional
atmosphere of trial combat, prosecutors too often pursue strategies with a singular determination rather
than with a careful deliberation.”); Medwed, supra note 26, at 36 (emphasizing that the “image of the
prosecutor as carnivorous aggressor in the adversarial den of the criminal courts is alive and well”);
Sklansky, supra note 2; Bellin, supra note 2.
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proof.59 The law guarantees criminal defendants a right to counsel and asks
neutral factfinders to resolve disputes.60 A prosecutor viewing this whole fabric
as “the law” that must be served would be indifferent to wins and losses. Such a
prosecutor succeeds when a jury convicts; succeeds when the jury acquits; and
succeeds when dismissing a case due to insufficient evidence or an unlawful
search or interrogation. As the Supreme Court explained in another context: “The
criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free.”61 A prosecutor
with a professional identity as a servant of the law would find satisfaction in that
result.
This understanding of the prosecutor as a servant of the law, rather than an
advocate for justice, would clarify and, in some areas, transform the traditional
conception of the prosecutor’s role. Importantly, this reconceptualization might
be accepted (or spurned) across the political spectrum because it does not fit
neatly into either “side” of the criminal justice debate. It will nudge prosecutors
toward severity when the background law is severe and towards leniency when
the background law is lenient. It could make prosecutors less adversarial and
more cooperative with defense counsel and judges. At its core, this
reconceptualization narrows the rhetorical scope of the prosecutorial function,
placing the focus on other actors, and ultimately the system itself, to ensure that
justice is done.
Importantly, a prosecutor who embraces the servant-of-the-law model
would not robotically enforce every criminal statute in every case. Most
obviously, the prosecutor would decline to prosecute cases with insufficient
evidence to prove the defendant’s guilt.62 This would include cases that depend
on police officers with credibility problems, jailhouse informants, coerced
confessions, flawed identification procedures, or questionable forensic science.63
The servant-of-the-law prosecutor would also preference defendant-protective
state and federal constitutional provisions over the mechanical enforcement of
criminal statutes. Thus, the prosecutor would decline to trigger bail conditions,
charges, or sentencing enhancements that would violate constitutional provisions
such as the Eighth Amendment’s proportionality principle, or its prohibition of

59. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 323 (1979) (describing the “constitutional necessity
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt”).
60. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. VI (guaranteeing criminal defendants facing incarceration the
right to counsel and trial by an impartial jury).
61. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
62. See infra Part I.A.
63. See BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL
PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG (2011) (chronicling causes of convictions of innocent defendants); Justin
George & Eli Hager, One Way to Deal With Cops Who Lie? Blacklist Them, Some DAs Say, MARSHALL
PROJECT (Jan. 17, 2019), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2019/01/17/one-way-to-deal-with-copswho-lie-blacklist-them-some-das-say [https://perma.cc/PT7L-9H2J] (reporting on prosecutors’
decisions to decline cases that depend on police officers with credibility problems).
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excessive bail or fines.64 The prosecutor would also rework plea practices to
ensure that defendants are not coerced to waive their Sixth Amendment right to
a jury trial.65
Perhaps most significantly, in light of the weighty due process and
discovery requirements that attach to even the most petty criminal case, servantof-the-law prosecutors would freely dismiss minor cases in response to resource
constraints.66 For example, in an age of police body cameras,67 even the smallest
case requires a prosecutor to gather and review the body camera footage from
officers who responded to the incident and interacted with the defendant or
victim.68 Prosecutors who cannot satisfy the legal obligations attendant to every
case on their docket must dismiss cases until they can.69 Given the breadth of
American criminal laws, all prosecutors decline to pursue some offenses to
preserve resources for more consequential prosecutions. Servant-of-the-law
prosecutors, keenly aware of the legal obligations that inhere in every
prosecution, would be no exception.

64. U.S. CONST. amend VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed,
nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”); Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 20 (2003) (“The
Eighth Amendment, which forbids cruel and unusual punishments, contains a ‘narrow proportionality
principle’ . . . .”).
65. U.S. CONST. amend VI (protecting the “right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial
jury”).
66. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86 (1963) (prosecutor must disclose all exculpatory
information held by government); State v. Crawford, 371 P.3d 381, 388 (Mont. 2016) (explaining that
Brady’s rule applies “[i]n all criminal cases”).
67. See Jeffrey Bellin & Shevarma Pemberton, Policing the Admissibility of Body Camera
Evidence, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 1425, 1429–32 (2019) (chronicling rapid spread of body cameras).
68. See Brady, 373 U.S. at 86 (requiring disclosure of potentially exculpatory evidence in the
possession of the government); Mark Bowes, Chesterfield Prosecutors Plan to Stop Handling
Misdemeanor Criminal Cases, Traffic Offenses Starting May 1 Because of Workload, RICHMOND
TIMES-DISPATCH (Feb. 21, 2018), http://www.richmond.com/news/local/crime/chesterfieldprosecutors-plan-to-stop-handling-misdemeanor-criminal-cases-traffic/article_a06b1fca-45e1-5eeba071-3fd4900b4117.html [https://perma.cc/CWL4-YKFD] (describing a local prosecutor’s decision to
stop prosecuting misdemeanor offenses, in part, due to their inability to fulfill an obligation to review
police body camera footage); Kimberly Kindy, Some U.S. Police Departments Dump Body-Camera
Programs
Amid
High
Costs,
WASH.
POST
(Jan.
21,
2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/some-us-police-departments-dump-body-cameraprograms-amid-high-costs/2019/01/21/991f0e66-03ad-11e9-b6a9-0aa5c2fcc9e4_story.html
[https://perma.cc/GL8K-AF8D] (“Prosecutors, too, are struggling to keep up with the added workload
and cost of body-camera footage.”); Kim Ogg, For Harris County, More Prosecutors Means More
Justice, HOUS. CHRON. (Feb. 9, 2019), https://www.houstonchronicle.com/opinion/outlook/article/ForHarris-County-more-prosecutors-means-more-13602759.php
[https://perma.cc/WE6R-4EFQ]
(explaining that prosecutor’s task now includes “gathering and reviewing a much greater amount of
evidence,” including “body camera footage from every officer at a scene”). Prosecutors could also
arguably fulfill Brady obligations by disclosing the material without review, although doing so would
raise prosecutorial competency and privacy concerns. See Jenia I. Turner, Managing Digital Discovery
in Criminal Cases, 109 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 237 (2019).
69. Cf. Josh Bowers, Physician, Heal Thyself: Discretion and the Problem of Excessive
Prosecutorial Caseloads, A Response to Adam Gershowitz and Laura Killinger, 106 NW. U.L. REV.
COLLOQUY 143, 148 (2011) (“[E]specially in misdemeanor cases, some amount of measured discretion
is not just permissible, but essential.”).
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Finally, in some cases, the law itself dictates that prosecutors make choices
without guidance, such as California’s “wobbler” offenses: identical offenses
that can be charged as felonies or misdemeanors at the prosecutors’ discretion.70
A prosecutor cannot faithfully carry out a legislative command that has no
substance. Consequently, servant-of-the-law prosecutors would default to the
less severe option. This prosecutorial-discretion version of the rule of lenity
would incentivize legislators to eschew laws that rely on prosecutorial intuition
rather than statutory guidance.71
A servant-of-the-law model will not resolve all prosecutorial choices, but
it would provide a default position for the American prosecutor, a much-needed
starting point for crafting nuanced rules and guidance. In light of the complexity
of American criminal justice, deviations from the default would be expected.
However, these deviations would be recognizable and thus more likely to be
accompanied by transparent and consistent explanations.
With the beginnings of a concrete normative theory of prosecutorial
behavior in hand, the question becomes whether such a theory is preferable to
the malleability of the “do justice” status quo. A shift in orientation may prove
unpalatable to both prosecutors who prefer the freedom to do “what is right” and
reformers inspired by prosecutors’ potential power to unilaterally disarm the
criminal justice system. But over the long term, more narrowly channeling the
power of prosecutors could be preferable to continued expansion. And many (if
not most) of the goals of the prosecutor-driven criminal justice reform movement
could be advanced by reorienting prosecutors as less adversarial servants of the
law.
The Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I fleshes out the problems of the
“do justice” status quo. Part II takes on the practicality question: Is it possible to
craft a normative theory of the prosecutor that places concrete limits on
prosecutorial discretion? It constructs a servant-of-the-law model of prosecution
and illustrates the model’s application to the most important prosecutorial
decisions. Part III addresses desirability: Is such a theory preferable to the “do
justice” status quo? Finally, Part IV considers the degree to which a servant-ofthe-law theory could complement rather than clash with the progressive
prosecution movement.

70. See Davis v. Mun. Court, 757 P.2d 11, 21 n.9 (Cal. 1988) (discussing judicial authority to
reduce “wobbler[s]” charged as felonies to misdemeanors at sentencing); Manduley v. Superior Court,
104 Cal. Rptr. 2d 140, 157 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (Nares, J., dissenting) (noting prosecutors’ “unbridled
discretion to charge a wobbler as a felony or misdemeanor . . . without any statutory criteria or
standards”).
71. See infra Part II.B.
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I.
WHAT’S WRONG WITH “DOING JUSTICE”?
The popularity of justice as a guiding prosecutorial principle is no fluke.
Like freedom, democracy, and apple pie, justice resonates with the American
public. Not only does everybody love justice, but the term is sufficiently flexible
to capture every criminal law related intuition. Justice serves as a ready
placeholder for a multitude of other values (fairness, proportionality, retribution,
mercy), providing a rhetorical roadmap to support whatever action a prosecutor
selects. In the hands of the right prosecutor, this freedom can be used for
beneficial purposes, particularly when other actors, such as police, legislators,
juries, and judges, fail to do justice.
Prosecutors don’t spend a lot of time defining “justice,”72 but their few
efforts to do so hint at the flaws in relying on the term as the prosecutorial
touchstone. It covers everything and therefore demands nothing. The NDAA’s
National Prosecution Standards explain that the responsibility to seek justice
“includes, but is not limited to, ensuring that the guilty are held accountable, that
the innocent are protected from unwarranted harm, and that the rights of all
participants, particularly victims of crime, are respected.”73 Reflecting a similar
perspective, one prominent prosecutor writes, “[w]hen we decide to prosecute, it
is because we decide that this is how justice will be done.”74 If the defendant
resists conviction, this prosecutor explains: “[T]he prosecutor becomes the most
zealous champion of justice you can imagine. He is then a full-fledged fighting
advocate; and he should be . . . . His job is now to fight fairly and firmly with all
his might to see that truth and justice prevail.”75 This ambiguous zealotry is both
admirable and a recipe for disaster. The villainous prosecutors who haunt legal
commentary push the boundaries of criminal law, discount exculpatory
information, and reflexively champion harsh punishment as a response to
crime.76 Yet, these prosecutors likely embrace the “do justice” mantra just as
72. Brian Forst, Prosecution Policy and Errors of Justice, in THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE
AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 51, 52 (John L. Worrall & M. Elaine Nugent-Borakove eds., 2008)
(“Prosecutors rarely articulate a rationale for determining how these choices are made.”).
73. NAT’L DIST. ATTORNEYS ASS’N, supra note 25, ¶ 1-1.1.
74. Whitney North Seymour, Jr., Why Prosecutors Act Like Prosecutors, 11 REC. ASS’N B.
CITY N.Y. 302, 312 (1956).
75. Id. at 313; see also MARK BAKER, D.A.: PROSECUTORS IN THEIR OWN WORDS 52 (1999)
(“Prosecutors believe they are doing the right thing. . . . You’re completely sure that what you’re doing
is the right thing all the time . . . .”); John Cannizzaro, Prosecutorial Ethics: New Insights After 75 Years
of Jurisprudence, THE PROSECUTOR FEATURE, Apr./May/June 2011, at 20, 29 (explaining that
prosecutors’ special duty is “to do the right thing”); Amy Weirich, The Changing Role of the District
Attorney, DAILY MEMPHIAN (Dec. 7, 2018), https://dailymemphian.com/article/1622/The-changingrole-of-the-district-attorney [https://perma.cc/N8FR-647T] (“As I tell our new assistant district attorneys
at orientation, our job is to do the right thing every day for the right reason.”).
76. See MARK GODSEY, BLIND INJUSTICE: A FORMER PROSECUTOR EXPOSES THE
PSYCHOLOGY AND POLITICS OF WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS 21 (2017) (emphasizing the aggressive
mindset of prosecutors as a critical failing of criminal justice); Fish, supra note 22, at 1446 (emphasizing

2020]

THEORIES OF PROSECUTION

1217

warmly as their many critics. The two sides merely disagree about what justice
means.77 As a result, continually shouting “do justice” at prosecutors is more
than an exercise in futility. It exacerbates the problems it is supposed to address.
Prosecutors’ critics embrace the “do justice” command because it provides
a rhetorical benchmark against which they can always find prosecutors’
decisions lacking.78 Judges, too, frequently invoke the slogan to criticize
prosecutorial failings of various stripes.79 Legislatures point to the prosecutors’
duty to “do justice” to ease worries about the enforcement of overbroad laws.80
In all of these applications, the malleability of the “do justice” command is its
greatest strength.
In practice, prosecutors rely on the freedom that “justice” provides to
leapfrog among distinct rationales for challenged behavior. For example,
prosecutors frequently invoke the need to ensure public safety.81 This “tough
justice” rhetoric can support severely punishing particular defendants to advance
instrumental crime-prevention goals. Most famously, federal prosecutors sent Al
Capone, Chicago’s “leading mobster,” to prison on tax charges when they could
not win convictions for his more notorious conduct.82 In modern times, federal
prosecutors tout their efforts to obtain severe sentences for gun possession as

that “prosecutors’ aggressiveness has severe consequences”); Bellin, supra note 2; Sklansky, supra note
2.
77. See Jean G. Sturtridge, The Trial Prosecutor and Ethics, in DOING JUSTICE: A
PROSECUTOR’S GUIDE TO ETHICS AND CIVIL LIABILITY 83, 83 (Ronald H. Clark ed., 2002)
(highlighting the “win-at-any-cost” prosecutors “who zealously represent society’s interest with a deeply
rooted conviction that their cause is just” as one of the most problematic in the office); cf. Thompson v.
Calderon, 120 F.3d 1045, 1075 (9th Cir. 1997) (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) (“The majority rightly says
that the prosecutor must seek above all to do justice, but seems confused about what justice is.”); United
States v. Wilson, 578 F.2d 67, 71–72 (5th Cir. 1978) (“Justice includes the acquittal of the innocent, but
Justice also includes the conviction of the guilty.”).
78. See Josie Duffy Rice, Cyrus Vance and the Myth of the Progressive Prosecutor, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/16/opinion/cy-vance-progressive-prosecutor.html
[https://perma.cc/Q6R4-VXKW] (criticizing prosecutors who claim to be reformers as insufficiently
progressive).
79. State v. Rivera, 99 A.3d 847, 859-60 (N.J. Super. A.D. 2014) (criticizing a prosecutor for
getting into the jury box during a witness’ testimony as “at best, a distracting antic inconsistent with the
seriousness of the prosecutor’s obligation to do justice”); Watters v. State, 313 P.3d 243, 248 (Nev.
2013) (criticizing a prosecutor’s use of a power point slide that included the defendant’s picture and the
word “guilty” as conflicting with a prosecutor’s obligation to “seek justice”).
80. See Rachel E. Barkow, Recharging the Jury: The Criminal Jury’s Constitutional Role in an
Era of Mandatory Sentencing, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 33, 62 (2003) (“[L]egislators can blame prosecutors
if they seek to charge individuals under an overinclusive law.”).
81. See Leon Neyfakh, How to Run Against a Tough-on-Crime DA—and Win, SLATE (Nov. 12,
2015),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/crime/2015/11/district_attorneys_scott_colom_prove
s_you_can_run_against_a_tough_on_crime.html [https://perma.cc/6PC9-MCTJ] (quoting prosecutor
Scott Colum: “[E]ven if people don’t know exactly what [prosecutors] do, they know that they’re
responsible for public safety”).
82. See Daniel C. Richman & William J. Stuntz, Al Capone’s Revenge: An Essay on the
Political Economy of Pretextual Prosecution, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 583 (2005).
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part of an effort to reduce violence in specific regions83 and nationwide.84 New
York City prosecutors use an automated “arrest alert system” to “incapacitate
high priority offenders with higher bail or more severe incarceration
sentences.”85 This results, they say, “in increased prosecutorial effectiveness and
enhanced public safety.”86
The progressive prosecution movement centers new rhetorical tools,
including a “populist justice” approach that attempts to mold discretionary
decisions to accord with constituent preferences.87 For example, one prominent
reform campaign includes the exhortation: “What the public wants to have
happen is what the District Attorney should be doing.”88 The populist prosecutor
can justify certain discretionary decisions, such as declining to invoke locally
unpopular laws, as channeling the will of the voters. Another progressive variant
seeks social justice, by counteracting a system perceived as overly punitive and
racist, and vigorously prosecuting police officers who violate the law.89
All of the above theories of prosecution fit neatly under a justice rubric. In
fact, the same prosecutor can invoke each of the above-described theories in
different (or the same) circumstances. For example, when Philadelphia District
Attorney Krasner announced the dismissal of marijuana cases, he invoked both
social justice—“I felt it was the right thing to do”—and public safety: “We could
use those resources to solve homicides.”90 Widely hailed progressive prosecutors
like Kim Foxx similarly center the importance of public safety to their role.91
83. See Daniel C. Richman, “Project Exile” and the Allocation of Federal Law Enforcement
Authority, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 369, 379 (2001) (summarizing program in Virginia).
84. Ali Watkins, In Fight Against Violent Crime, Justice Dept. Targets Low-Level Gun
Offenders, N.Y. TIMES (May 7, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/07/us/politics/jeff-sessionsgun-charges.html [https://perma.cc/3WCT-MCPW].
85. JENNIFER A. TALLON ET AL., THE INTELLIGENCE-DRIVEN PROSECUTION MODEL, CTR.
FOR
COURT
INNOVATION
23
(Sept.
2016),
https://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/files/documents/IDPM_Research_Report_FINAL.PDF
[https://perma.cc/R2Y8-F8KU].
86. Id.
87. See, e.g., Hylton, supra note 11 (“I have heard your calls for ‘no justice, no peace!’”).
88. Brooklyn Defender Services, Power of Prosecutors, YOUTUBE (Sep. 10, 2017),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zrgvlx7MnqA [https://perma.cc/ET5M-6TSG] (“What the public
wants to have happen is what the District Attorney should be doing.”); see also KATHERINE K. MOY ET
AL., RATE MY DISTRICT ATTORNEY: TOWARDS A SCORECARD FOR PROSECUTORS’ OFFICES 4 (2018)
(proposing a mechanism for rating prosecutor offices that would help reveal “whether a prosecutors’
office has effectively pursued the electorate’s policy priorities”).
89. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Community Prosecutors, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1465, 1508 (2002)
(proposing “to recast the professional community of prosecutors and, in so doing, reinvigorate[] the idea
of prosecuting for social justice”); Bazelon & Krinsky, supra note 16 (“In the past two years, a wave of
prosecutors promising less incarceration and more fairness have been elected across the country.”)
90. Brian X. McCrone, Marijuana Criminal Cases Dropped En Masse by Philadelphia District
Attorney, NBC PHILA. (Feb. 15, 2018), https://www.nbcphiladelphia.com/news/local/MarijuanaCriminal-Cases-Dropped-En-Masse-by-Philadelphia-District-Attorney-Larry-Krasner474228023.html [https://perma.cc/8VQ7-R6WL].
91. See Megan Crepeau, After Momentous Week, Prosecutor Kim Foxx Says ‘We Have To Right
Wrongs,’ CHI. TRIBUNE (Nov. 20, 2017), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-met-
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Foxx instructs “her prosecutors to focus less on narrower legal points” and more
on the big picture: “[D]etermining the fairest outcome for each case.”92 But Foxx
responds to critics who say: “You’ve politicized [the prosecutor’s office] by
taking on these social issues,” by emphasizing that she “always” situates change
“in the framework of safety.”93 Baltimore’s chief prosecutor, Marilyn Mosby,
invoked the public outcry for justice to defend the controversial prosecution of
police officers responsible for the death of Freddie Gray.94 Saint Louis
Prosecutor Robert McCulloch invoked the same principle to defend the
controversial decision not to prosecute the Ferguson police officer who killed
Michael Brown.95 This is the allure of a justice benchmark. Freed of any specific
guidance, prosecutors, along with their champions and detractors, can mix and
match justice-based theories of prosecution to support almost any policy or
action.
The interchangeability of various, often inconsistent, justice-based
prosecutorial approaches is not the only problem. There is also indeterminacy.
Many of the above-referenced approaches (public safety, social justice,
populism, fairness) provide only slightly more guidance with respect to specific
prosecutorial decisions than the overarching “do justice” command itself. Yet,
prosecutors must make hard decisions about real cases. For example, if the
evidence to support a prosecution is close to the boundary, what guidance does
it add to say that the prosecutor should seek “public safety” or “social justice”?
Would the public safety prosecutor decrease the requisite evidentiary bar, and
the social justice prosecutor increase it? Does it depend on the case, the victim,
the defendant, and by how much? At best, concepts like “social justice” and
“public safety” hint at the direction of a possible prosecutorial decision, but they
give individual prosecutors (and their critics) little guidance about where to draw
any particular line.
None of this means that justice should be abandoned as the guiding
prosecutorial principle. It may well be the best of a flawed set of alternatives. In
the current climate, the freedom of action provided by the absence of a normative
theory allows prosecutors to blunt the sharp edges of the system that brought us
kim-foxx-wrongful-convictions-20171117-story.html
[https://perma.cc/ZCK8-FGL3]
(“As
a
prosecutor’s office, inasmuch as we fight for public safety, we also recognize that we have to right
wrongs and be willing to do that.”).
92. Id.
93. Ted Slowik, Foxx Understands Retailers’ Frustrations with Theft Policy; Flossmoor
Resident’s Office is prosecuting fewer offenders but says her new approach is addressing the underlying
causes of crime; Interview with Cook County State’s Attorney, DAILY SOUTHTOWN (Feb. 25, 2018),
https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/6ca4a773-e921-422d-b5304b44dabfd071/?context=1000516.
94. See Hylton, supra note 11.
95. Jeremy Kohler, Statement of St. Louis Prosecuting Attorney Robert P. McCulloch, ST.
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Nov. 24, 2014), https://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-andcourts/statement-of-st-louis-prosecuting-attorney-robert-p-mcculloch/article_2becfef3-9b4b-5e1e9043-f586f389ef91.html [https://perma.cc/77KD-ETEB] (“It is my sworn duty and that of the grand
jury to seek justice, and not simply obtain an indictment or conviction.”).
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mass incarceration. But it is worth keeping in mind that mass incarceration arose
under the “do justice” status quo.96 And the lack of a concrete normative
principle hobbles efforts to control prosecutorial excesses of all kinds, including
unnecessary severity. Granting prosecutors a roaming mandate to “do justice”
comes at a cost. The question becomes: Is there a better alternative?
II.
AN ALTERNATE THEORY OF THE PROSECUTOR
Justice as a job description works well for superheroes. When an evil villain
attempts to destroy the world, justice provides a ready answer for whether to
respond (yes!) and how (whatever it takes!). For the typical local prosecutor
attempting to emerge from under a pile of paperwork, however, it is a nebulous
command. The challenge, then, is identifying an alternative that would offer real
guidance in the day-to-day tasks that occupy prosecutors. This Section sketches
an alternative “servant-of-the-law” theory to govern those decisions—at least as
a default framework for thinking about the prosecutor’s role. It begins with
charging—often the first and most important decision that a prosecutor makes—
before moving to other aspects of the prosecutorial role like plea bargaining and
case processing.97 Along the way, it highlights the inadequacy of “doing justice”
as an answer to these questions.
A. Assessing Evidentiary Sufficiency
Any theory about prosecutorial behavior should begin with charging.98
Charging at the state and local level typically has two components. First, a
prosecutor must determine whether to accept a case initiated by the police.
Second, the prosecutor must determine the precise charge (or charges).
For many cases, the charge will be obvious (e.g., residential burglary) and
the critical question will be whether there is sufficient evidence that (a) the crime
occurred, and (b) the defendant, as opposed to some other person, is responsible.
To consistently screen these cases, prosecutors must identify some quantum of
evidence to serve as a prerequisite to prosecution. The law sets a low floor:
probable cause.99 Absent probable cause to believe the defendant guilty of an
offense, the prosecutor cannot legally maintain a charge.100 Ethics codes echo
96. See Aziz Z. Huq, The Difficulties of Democratic Mercy, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 1679, 1697
(2015) (“[T]he rise of prosecutorial discretion since the 1970s coincided with an unprecedented leap in
the incarceration rate.”).
97. Lissa Griffin & Ellen Yaroshefsky, Ministers of Justice and Mass Incarceration, 30 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 301, 315 (2017) (“A prosecutor’s charging decision lies at the core of the prosecution
function.”).
98. AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND
DEFENSE FUNCTION 72 (1993) (Standard 3-3.9 cmt.) (“The charging decision is the heart of the
prosecutor function.”). The comment also states: “By its very nature, however, the exercise of discretion
cannot be reduced to a formula.” Id.
99. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978).
100. Id.
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this standard.101 Unfortunately, beyond this minimal guidance, the “codes are
deficient regarding the [requisite] degree of confidence and how it should be
achieved.”102
Those who take justice as the prosecutor’s benchmark struggle to find
consensus as to how a prosecutor should assess the requisite proof of guilt ex
ante.103 Among the commonly referenced possibilities are (1) deferring close
cases to the jury,104 or (2) proceeding only in cases where the prosecutor
personally believes the defendant to be guilty.105 Both choices are objectionable,
although they fit comfortably under a justice umbrella. Most cases never get to
trial, and most convictions result from guilty pleas.106 Consequently, if a
prosecution is unwarranted, that decision cannot be deferred to a jury verdict that
may never come. Similarly, relying on a prosecutor’s personal (and potentially
idiosyncratic) belief in a particular defendant’s guilt or culpability is unappealing
for obvious reasons. Instead, as discussed below, the prosecutor should be tasked
with assessing a defendant’s substantive guilt in light of the evidence that would
be introduced at trial—i.e., the result most consistent with the law.
A servant-of-the-law approach to charging tracks Department of Justice
(DOJ) guidance that instructs federal prosecutors to pursue “readily provable”
cases, “cases that the government should win if there were a trial.”107 The DOJ
explains: a charge is not “readily provable” if “the prosecutor has a good faith
doubt . . . for legal or evidentiary reasons . . . as to the government’s ability

101. See AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 98, at 70–71 (Standard 3-3.9(a)); DEP’T. OF JUSTICE,
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE MANUAL ¶ 9.27.200 cmt. (“[F]ailure to meet the minimal
requirement of probable cause is an absolute bar to initiating a federal prosecution . . . .”).
102. Bennett L. Gershman, The Prosecutor’s Duty to Truth, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 309, 337
(2001).
103. See Zacharias & Green, supra note 42, at 50 (“The academic literature reflects vigorous
disagreement about how convinced of guilt prosecutors should be before bringing or continuing
charges.”).
104. See H. Richard Uviller, The Virtuous Prosecutor in Quest of an Ethical Standard: Guidance
from the ABA, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1145, 1159 (1973); see also Maura Ewing, America’s Leading ReformMinded District Attorney Has Taken His Most Radical Step Yet, SLATE (Dec 4, 2018),
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/12/philadelphia-district-attorney-larry-krasner-criminaljustice-reform.html [https://perma.cc/K4NY-47T5] (reporting former Pennsylvania governor and
Philadelphia District Attorney Ed Rendell’s disagreement with Krasner about charging homicides, with
Rendell arguing “that juries and judges were best situated to determine the facts of a case that might lead
to a heightened sentence”).
105. Bennett L. Gershman, A Moral Standard for the Prosecutor’s Exercise of the Charging
Discretion, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 513, 522 (1993); cf. AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 98, at 71 (Standard
3-3.9(c)) (“A prosecutor should not be compelled by his or her supervisor to prosecute a case in which
he or she has a reasonable doubt about the guilt of the accused.”).
106. See Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 143 (2012) (“Ninety-seven percent of federal
convictions and ninety-four percent of state convictions are the result of guilty pleas.”).
107. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Thornburgh Bluesheet (1989): Plea Policy for Federal Prosecutors,
6 FED. SENT’G. REP. 347, 348 (1994) [hereinafter Thornburgh Memorandum]. With respect to the
evidentiary threshold, the National District Attorneys Association’s standard states that “[a] prosecutor
should file charges” that “she reasonably believes can be substantiated by admissible evidence at trial.”
NAT’L DIST. ATTORNEYS ASS’N, supra note 25, ¶ 4-2.2.
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readily to prove a charge.”108 Note that these formulations subtly discount the
prosecutor’s subjective assessment of the defendant’s guilt. They instead focus
on the prosecutor’s professional assessment of a jury’s reaction (“should win”)
to the expected evidence.109 “Should,” in this context, is best read to reflect a
jury following the judicial instructions that describe its role. Although juries have
the raw power to acquit for any reason, courts instruct juries that they “must” (or
sometimes “should”) convict when the evidence proves the defendant’s guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.110 Juries in the post-Civil War South reflexively
acquitted white “defendants who committed crimes against African-Americans
and white Republicans,” yet the prosecution of such cases is easily defended.111
In modern times, the government could properly maintain a strong case against
a police officer even though it expected a police-friendly jury to acquit. Or the
prosecutor could pursue a case against an alleged date rapist even if the
prosecutor believed the jury would acquit based on disagreement with the law.112
The same principle applies even when the prosecutor (as opposed to the jury)
disagrees with the law’s application. For example, a servant-of-the-law
prosecutor with philosophical objections to drug or gun possession laws would
not dismiss a drug or gun case based on their personal opinion that the jury
“should” not convict.
Importantly, in making the charging decision, the servant-of-the-law
prosecutor—interested only in whether the defendant should, legally speaking,
be convicted—would be keenly attuned to detecting faulty prosecution evidence.
This would include cases that depend on police officers with credibility
problems, jailhouse informants, coerced confessions, flawed identification
procedures, or questionable forensic science.113 Even if unsophisticated jurors
might be swayed by such evidence, a servant-of-the-law prosecutor would
decline to offer any evidence that a reasonable juror should reject.

108. Thornburgh Memorandum, supra note 107.
109. The Crown Prosecution Service, responsible for charging in England and Wales, requires
the prosecutor to find a “realistic prospect of conviction” which “means that an objective, impartial and
reasonable jury or bench of magistrates or judge hearing a case alone, properly directed and acting in
accordance with the law, is more likely than not to convict the defendant of the charge alleged.” The
Code for Crown Prosecutors: The Evidential Stage, THE CROWN PROSECUTION SERV. §§ 4.6–4.7 (Oct.
2018), https://www.cps.gov.uk/publication/code-crown-prosecutors [https://perma.cc/XD28-5G22].
110. Eric L. Muller, The Hobgoblin of Little Minds? Our Foolish Law of Inconsistent Verdicts,
111 HARV. L. REV. 771, 785 (1998) (noting that “[j]uries are routinely instructed” that they “must” or
“should” convict defendants “whose guilt the government proved beyond a reasonable doubt”).
111. See Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of Criminal Jury in the United
States, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 867, 890 (1994) (chronicling the problem of “Southern jury nullification
following the Civil War”).
112. But cf. Holly Yan, A Prosecutor Refused to Try an Ex-Frat Leader’s Sex Assault Case. Here
are her Eye-Opening Reasons Why, CNN (Dec. 13, 2018) https://www.cnn.com/2018/12/12/us/baylorrape-allegation-letter-from-prosecutor/index.html [https://perma.cc/TU7G-EFC5] (recounting a
prosecutor’s explanation for declining to pursue rape charge because “our jurors aren’t ready to blame
rapists and not victims”).
113. See GARRETT, supra note 63; George & Hager, supra note 63.
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Putting the above-described standards together reveals a concrete
evidentiary charging standard: a prosecutor should only charge a case when the
prosecutor expects that the evidence introduced at trial will prove the defendant’s
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Importantly, this standard is not merely
descriptive. It does not turn on a prediction of whether the jury will convict.
Instead, it looks to whether, given the admissible evidence, the jury should
(legally speaking) convict. In other words, the standard tracks the law. Servantof-the-law prosecutors would not select charges based on their subjective
perception of guilt or justice, or to protect the public, or by deferring to the result
the community prefers. Rather, these prosecutors would seek to obtain results
that mirror the applicable laws.114
B. Selecting a Charge
Once the prosecutor is satisfied there is sufficient evidence of guilt to
warrant prosecution, the next question is how stringently to charge. Even if the
defendant’s guilt is clear, a prosecutor has the power to dismiss the case entirely,
or to file more serious charges than the facts support.
Application of the servant-of-the-law model is clearest with respect to
charges with concrete elements and delineations. For example, Pennsylvania law
creates six grades of theft that track “the market value of the property at the time
and place of the crime.”115 The framework (simplified slightly) is as follows:

First-degree felony
Second-degree felony
Third-degree felony
First-degree misdemeanor
Second-degree misdemeanor
Third-degree misdemeanor

over $500,000
$100,000 to $500,000
$2000 to $100,000
$200 to $2000
$50 to $200
up to $50

Imagine that the defendant stole a two-year-old laptop computer left
momentarily unattended at the library. The computer cost $2,500 new, but is

114. See, e.g., Ewing, supra note 104 (quoting Larry Krasner on charging: “We are going to
proceed on charges that are supported by the facts in the case, period”).
115. Grading of Theft Offenses, 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3903(c)(1) (2017). The statute also singles
out certain property theft (e.g., theft of “anhydrous ammonia”) for special treatment regardless of value.
Id. § 3903(a)(4).
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likely worth significantly less on the resale market. If justice is the measuring
stick, it is unclear how the prosecutor should proceed. Some prosecutors may
seek justice by giving the defendant a break, while others may view justice as
requiring the most serious plausible charge (a felony). The NDAA’s National
Prosecution Standards illustrate the problem. The Standards direct prosecutors
to “only file those charges that are consistent with the interests of justice.”116 To
help prosecutors implement this command, the Standards enumerate seventeen
factors that “may be considered” in determining whether to bring any charge,
plus thirteen factors that “may be relevant” to selecting the precise charge.117 The
Standards emphasize that prosecutors can still consider unenumerated factors.118
Some of the listed factors (“other aggravating or mitigating circumstances”)
actually broaden, rather than restrict, the calculus.119 That’s the “do justice”
alternative. Justice sounds like a great standard, but it boils down to a broad
license for prosecutors to do whatever they think is right. Apart from obvious
consistency concerns, there is a legitimacy problem as well. When prosecutors
manipulate charges in the interest of justice, they are effectively amending the
laws enacted by the legislature. This may be unavoidable where the law itself
provides amorphous and subjective benchmarks. But it is problematic where, as
for many of the most commonly charged offenses, the statutory elements are
clear.120
A potentially preferable alternative directs the prosecutor to “serve the law”
by charging the offense for which a jury should (legally speaking) convict—here,
the first-degree misdemeanor given the current value of the computer. This
standard echoes the discussion from the preceding section and provides both a
charging floor and a ceiling. It prevents the prosecutor from giving the defendant
a break by downgrading the offense, but it also limits the prosecutor’s ability to
“overcharge.”
The concept of overcharging, while ubiquitous in criticism of prosecutorial
behavior, is difficult to define using a justice benchmark and so impossible to
restrain.121 The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice illustrate the difficulty:
The line separating overcharging from the sound exercise of
prosecutorial discretion is necessarily a subjective one, but the key

116. NAT’L DIST. ATTORNEYS ASS’N, supra note 25, ¶ 4-2.4.
117. Id. ¶ 4-1.3 (“Screening: Factors to Consider”), ¶ 4-2.4 (“Charging: Factors to Consider”).
The Standards include another twenty factors, and eleven sub-factors, to consider in negotiating a plea
agreement. Id. ¶ 5-3.1.
118. Id.
119. Id. ¶ 4-2.4.
120. See infra Part III.A (listing commonly prosecuted offenses).
121. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 1, at 31 (“Prosecutors routinely engage in overcharging, a
practice that involves ‘tacking on’ additional charges that they know they cannot prove . . . or that they
can technically prove but are inconsistent with the legislative intent or otherwise inappropriate.”); Kyle
Graham, Overcharging, 11 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 701, 702 (2014) (recognizing prevalence of the term,
but noting that typically commentators “have failed to explain precisely what they mean by
‘overcharging’”).
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consideration is the prosecutor’s commitment to the interests of justice,
fairly bringing those charges he or she believes are supported by the
facts without “piling on” charges in order to unduly leverage an accused
to forgo his or her right to trial.122
Again we see the familiar role played by generic appeals to “the interest of
justice,” and the centrality of vague qualifiers (“fairly,” “unduly”) and colloquial
metaphors (“piling on”). A more serviceable definition of overcharging would
be: charging the defendant with an offense or enhancement that is not “readily
provable,” or an offense for which the jury should not convict.123 Here the ABA’s
illustration resonates with one provided in the federal charging guidance
referenced in Part II.A: “charges should not be filed simply to exert leverage to
induce a plea.”124 This principle fits comfortably within the servant-of-the-law
model. It also parallels the rhetoric of progressive prosecutors who seek to alter
charging practices to eliminate overcharging. In a recent profile, a leading voice
of the progressive prosecution movement, Philadelphia District Attorney Larry
Krasner, embraced a charging philosophy that parallels the standard described
above: “We are not going to overcharge. . . . We are not going to try to coerce
defendants. We are going to proceed on charges that are supported by the facts
in the case, period. The era of trying to get away with the highest charge
regardless of the facts is over.”125 Interestingly, this notion of structured charging
does not fit neatly under a broad appeal to justice. For example, could a
prosecutor who is confident of the defendant’s guilt but seeks to spare a childvictim the trauma of trial, “pile on” charges to coerce a plea? An appeal to “do
justice,” “public safety,” “social justice,” or “popular will” provides no answer.
Perhaps it is no coincidence, then, that the NDAA’s justice-focused National
Prosecution Standards do not include any restriction on filing charges to obtain
plea bargaining leverage.126
The servant-of-the-law charging strategy described above requires
additional nuance in scenarios where the law itself provides choices but little
guidance. There are three iterations. First, the law may provide only amorphous
and subjective guidance. For example, Virginia’s aggravated manslaughter
statute applies when “the conduct of the defendant was so gross, wanton and

122. AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 98, at 77 (Section 3-3.9 cmt.).
123. See Part II.A. Use of the term “readily” to modify “provable” suggests a limit on the effort
that will be spent trying to establish currently unclear offenses. For an example of a prosecutor’s
description of her office’s strained interpretation of this limit, see Stephanie M. Rose, Finding Humanity,
30 FED. SENT’G REP. 186, 187 (2018).
124. John Ashcroft, Memo Regarding Policy on Charging of Criminal Defendants, DEP’T OF
JUST. (Sept. 22, 2003), https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2003/September/03_ag_516.htm
(echoing earlier guidance).
125. Ewing, supra note 114.
126. The only limit in the Standards, placed under the header “Improper Leveraging,” is that the
prosecutor “should not file charges where the sole purpose is to obtain from the accused a release of
potential civil claims.” NAT’L DIST. ATTORNEYS ASS’N, supra note 25, ¶ 4-2.3
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culpable as to show a reckless disregard for human life.”127 Second, a statute may
provide choices without guidance, leaving the charge determination entirely up
to the prosecutor. This is the case with California’s “wobbler” offenses—single
offenses that can be charged as felonies or misdemeanors at the discretion of the
prosecutor.128 Third, the law may provide a facially clear standard, but signal a
desire that the prosecutor invoke the standard sparingly. Examples of this last
iteration typically involve draconian enhancements to standard punishments
tempered by an extra step beyond charging that the prosecutor can decline to
exercise.
The first iteration (crimes with inherently subjective elements) fits into the
existing model. The servant-of-the-law prosecutor must make an objective
determination as to whether the admissible evidence will establish proof of the
ambiguous element (“gross, wanton and culpable”) beyond a reasonable doubt.
The exercise will be more difficult than in the earlier Pennsylvania theft example,
but it is the same exercise we ask of jurors and judges, and an unavoidable aspect
of certain common law crimes. True, prosecutors will reach different conclusions
across jurisdictions and over time. But here, the legislature knowingly invites
inconsistency by defining a criminal offense by reference to ambiguous terms.
A servant-of-the-law prosecutor will have to accept that inconsistency as part of
the law.
The second and third iterations described above are anathema to a servantof-the-law model. The servant-of-the-law prosecutor can and should reject
discretionary choices devoid of legal guidance. The most effective way to do this
would be to apply a prosecutorial discretion “rule of lenity” that defaults to the
less severe option when the legislature tries to dictate a standardless choice.
Typically applied by courts in the statutory construction context, the “rule of
lenity requires ambiguous criminal laws to be interpreted in favor of the
defendants subjected to them.”129 Among other things, this pushes “Congress to
speak more clearly.”130 It is a small leap to apply this same principle to
prosecutorial discretion in a servant-of-the-law regime. Justice Antonin Scalia
illustrated the thinking in a related context as follows: “[O]nly the legislature
may define crimes and fix punishments. Congress cannot, through ambiguity,
effectively leave that function to the courts—much less to the administrative
bureaucracy.”131

127. VA CODE ANN. § 18.2-36.1(B) (2004).
128. See Davis v. Mun. Court, 757 P.2d 11 (Cal. 1988); Manduley v. Superior Court, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 140 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001). For an example, see CAL. PEN. CODE § 473(a) (setting forth penalty
for forgery as “imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year, or by imprisonment” of sixteen
months, two years, or three years under CAL. PEN. CODE § 1170(h)).
129. United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 514 (2008) (plurality).
130. Id.
131. Whitman v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 352, 354 (2014) (Scalia, J. writing separately on denial
of writ of certiorari) (emphasis removed).
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This default to leniency is also appropriate when a standard exists for a
sentencing enhancement or other provision, but the legislature expresses a desire
for prosecutors to decline to invoke the provision even when that standard is met.
For example, federal law authorizes draconian sentences for repeat drug
offenders, but in a separate statute neutralizes these enhancements unless the
United States Attorney takes an affirmative step to authorize their imposition.132
Prosecutors got the message. A recent United States Sentencing Commission
study found that federal prosecutors triggered these enhancements in only 12.3
percent of cases where they applied.133 This is an unsettling state of affairs. The
law does not impose these life-changing enhancements on eligible offenders. It
offers them to federal prosecutors to use as they wish. Declining to accept this
offer is consistent with, and best serves, the law. Stated another way, when the
legislature provides punishments without standards, there is no law to serve.
Even with the caveats described above, commentators may object to
making charging decisions by plugging provable facts into a statutory framework
because of the perceived severity of that framework in many jurisdictions.134 For
example, unlike the federal provision, California’s “three strikes” law signals a
legislative intent for broad application.135 A California prosecutor serving the
law would charge cases with qualifying “strikes,” placing the defendant at risk
for the extreme sentences apparently sought by the legislature. This introduces
the issue of prosecutorial nullification.136 A key limitation of a servant-of-thelaw approach is that it disfavors prosecutorial nullification. Justice, by contrast,
embraces nullification when it is the right thing to do. The social justice
prosecutor can nullify the law to correct perceived legislative and law
enforcement inequity. The public safety prosecutor might use the same power to
dismiss calls to prosecute police officers or vigilantes. The populist prosecutor
can embrace nullification as an opportunity to channel the (local) popular will.
The possibilities are endless. Thus, further discussion of prosecutorial
132. 21 U.S.C. § 851(a)(1) (“No person . . . shall be sentenced to increased punishment by reason
of one or more prior convictions, unless . . . , the United States attorney files an information with the
court . . . .”).
133. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, APPLICATION AND IMPACT OF 21 U.S.C § 851:
ENHANCED PENALTIES FOR FEDERAL DRUG TRAFFICKING OFFENDERS 6 (2018),
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/researchpublications/2018/20180712_851-Mand-Min.pdf [https://perma.cc/7SNC-SFN6].
134. See Bruce Green & Ellen Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial Accountability 2.0, 92 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 51, 91 (2016) (highlighting criticism of “resulting harsh sentences”).
135. California law states, “[a]ny person convicted of a serious felony who previously has been
convicted of a serious felony . . . shall receive” an enhanced sentence. CAL. PEN. CODE § 667(a)(1)
(2019). See also id. § 667(b) (declaration of legislative intent); id. § 667(g) (“The prosecution shall plead
and prove all known prior felony serious or violent convictions and shall not enter into any agreement
to strike or seek the dismissal of any prior serious and/or violent felony conviction allegation . . . .”). On
the other hand, the law also authorizes the prosecutor to “move to dismiss” a strike “in the furtherance
of justice,” which could trigger the default to leniency discussed above. See id. § 667(f)(2).
136. See Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Prosecutorial Nullification, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1243, 1245 (2011)
(exploring “prosecutorial nullification as a distinct species of prosecutorial discretion that presents a set
of intriguing, important, and complex questions”).
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nullification must be postponed to Part IV. For now, it is enough to note that
even if we accept the appeal of nullification, similar results can often be obtained
through structured legal processes, such as drug courts or diversion programs.
Here, we are concerned only with charging. From a servant-of-the-law
perspective, our hypothetical laptop-stealing defendant could be charged with
the offense that best fits the provable facts: first degree misdemeanor theft. (The
servant-of-the-law prosecutor could not charge a more severe offense as a
negotiating tactic or to try to coerce a plea.) From there, the case can proceed to
adjudication or be steered into a diversion program where the prosecutor or judge
would dismiss the charge and expunge any record subject to various conditions
(e.g., restitution). Diversion programs are discussed further in Part III.B.
It is also worth noting that the servant-of-the-law prosecutor must serve
constitutional law that may complicate the application of the most draconian
criminal statutes. For example, a servant-of-the-law prosecutor would avoid
charging cases that prevent defendants from exercising their right to trial. This
scenario arises in at least two ways: (1) when, in a congested court system,
defendants are detained prior to trial and an inevitable plea deal will provide a
more attractive alternative to a post-trial acquittal,137 and (2) when a mandatory
sentencing provision magnifies the likely punishment to such a degree that even
a reasonable innocent defendant would accept a guilty plea (for example,
California’s “three strikes” law as applied to a relatively minor offense).138 In
these scenarios, the prosecutor need not ignore this context in selecting a charge.
And where the charge itself jeopardizes the defendant’s constitutional rights, a
servant-of-the-law prosecutor would preference the Constitution over the robotic
application of a criminal statute.
C. Prioritization and Plea Bargaining
Any principle governing prosecutorial behavior must account for resource
constraints, particularly at the state level. Police will often present prosecutors
with more readily provable cases than they can responsibly prosecute.139 Issa
Kohler-Hausmann documented New York City misdemeanor prosecutors

137. Laura Sullivan, Inmates Who Can’t Make Bail Face Stark Options, NPR (Jan. 22, 2010),
https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=122725819 [https://perma.cc/GYX7-Y6ZU].
138. See Jeffrey Bellin, Waiting for Justice, SLATE (Feb. 7, 2018), https://slate.com/news-andpolitics/2018/02/a-new-way-mandatory-minimum-sentences-have-been-demonstrated-to-severelywarp-justice.html [https://perma.cc/R9XB-G3LG]. Note that the Supreme Court has not yet recognized
a Sixth Amendment constraint on plea bargaining. Cf. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 365 (1978)
(rejecting constitutional challenge to prosecutor’s use of draconian enhancement as plea bargaining
leverage). But the Court has also not ruled it out, leaving prosecutors some freedom to fill in those
contours. Id. (“[B]road though [the prosecutor’s] discretion may be, there are undoubtedly constitutional
limits upon its exercise.”).
139. See NAT’L DIST. ATTORNEYS ASS’N, supra note 25, § 5-4 cmt. (“There are few prosecutors
who have the resources that would be required to try every case.”).
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handling caseloads that “often number between 100 and 200.”140 The volume
extends to more serious cases as well. Adam Gershowitz and Laura Killinger,
reporting on astronomical state prosecutor caseloads across the country,
highlighted Harris County, Texas (Houston), “where some prosecutors are
handling upwards of 1500 felonies per year and over 500 felonies at any one
time.”141
In light of these caseload realities, many prosecutors need to dismiss some
cases to competently handle the rest. This requires prioritization. Prosecutors
“doing justice” have a free hand in deciding how to prioritize. A servant-of-thelaw prosecutor’s decisions would be guided by formal legal strictures. A
prosecutor can prioritize cases the law considers most serious, using cues like
sentencing ranges and legislative labels (misdemeanor, felony, first degree,
second degree, etc.).142 One Virginia prosecutors’ office, for example, recently
responded to caseload pressure by declining to handle misdemeanor cases at
all.143
The other prosecutorial prioritization tool is plea bargaining. Observers
identify plea bargaining as the heart of prosecutorial power, given that 95 percent
of criminal convictions result from guilty pleas.144 Complicating matters, there
are two competing theoretical narratives of plea bargaining, labeled here the
“Godfather paradigm” and the “shadow-of-trial paradigm.” A servant-of-the-law
prosecutor would engage in plea bargaining under the latter, but not the former
paradigm.
In the “Godfather paradigm,”145 the prosecutor unilaterally controls plea
bargaining and guides the process to a desired result. For disfavored defendants,
the prosecutor inflates charges to a point where the defendant cannot risk trial.
The defendant then reluctantly agrees to plead guilty to avoid an excessive trial
penalty. Stingy discovery regimes keep defendants ignorant of their trial
chances, and draconian sentencing laws push trial out of reach. For favored
defendants, the process works in reverse. Prosecutors offer plea terms so lenient
that the defendant would be foolish to refuse. These deals can be hammered out

140. Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice and Mass Misdemeanors, 66 STAN. L. REV.
611, 664 (2014).
141. Adam M. Gershowitz & Laura R. Killinger, The State (Never) Rests: How Excessive
Prosecutorial Caseloads Harm Criminal Defendants, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 261, 271 (2011).
142. See infra Part II.D.
143. See Bowes, supra note 68.
144. See Jed S. Rakoff, Why Prosecutors Rule the Criminal Justice System—And What Can Be
Done About It, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1429, 1430 (2017) (“The plea bargain is the ultimate source of this
ever-increasing prosecutorial power.”).
145. I draw this descriptive term from the movie The Godfather. For the clip of the famous “offer
you can’t refuse,” see IsiKermesse, I’m Gonna Make Him an Offer He Can’t Refuse, YOUTUBE (Oct.
18, 2010), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SeldwfOwuL8 [https://perma.cc/4N76-TSFM].
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without input from victims and police. And the parties can use charge and fact
bargaining, and stipulated sentences to minimize judicial second-guessing.146
The competing “shadow-of-trial paradigm” posits prosecutors as less like
Mafiosos and more like bureaucrats. These prosecutors process more provable
cases than they (or the courts) can try. This gives prosecutors an incentive to
compromise with defendants (and their attorneys) in much the same way that
civil parties reach settlements. The prosecutor and defense attorney assess the
likely outcome of the case—in light of the assigned judge and local juries—and
craft a resolution that discounts that outcome in exchange for the defendant’s
waiver of the right to a trial. For the most frequent state cases (e.g., drugs,
common law crimes, DUIs, domestic violence), such deals become standardized.
Discovery practices, the defendant’s own knowledge, and counsel’s experience
permit sufficient pre-plea case assessments. And the trial penalty, while still
present, is modest enough that defendants can still exercise their trial right.
The “Godfather paradigm” neatly suits prosecutors seeking justice. A
prosecutor who equates justice with severe penal consequences can seek to
maximize guilty pleas and sentencing severity by manipulating the charges. A
prosecutor seeking social justice can steer sympathetic defendants to lenient
outcomes by offering generous terms. To avoid legislative and judicial override,
prosecutors can work with defense counsel to massage the charges and facts to
reach their desired result. In essence, plea agreements provide a ready
mechanism for parties to bargain around the law to achieve justice.147
On the other hand, the “shadow-of-trial paradigm” neatly suits a servantof-the-law model of prosecution. The widespread settlement of civil cases is
typically viewed as a means of enforcing, not undermining, the law.148 Similarly,
plea bargains can be structured so that agreements track likely post-trial
outcomes, even with standardized discounts. By adhering to the “shadow-of-trial
paradigm,” prosecutors could engage in plea bargaining while adhering to their
role as servants of the law.149 In fact, empirical evidence suggests that in most
circumstances, repeat-player attorneys share an assessment of the likely trial

146. See Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Judicial Participation in Plea Negotiations: A Comparative
View, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 199, 213 (2006) (discussing various plea bargaining strategies including
charge and fact bargaining).
147. Cf. Michael Tonry, Sentencing in America, 1975-2025, 42 CRIME & JUST. 141, 165–69
(2013) (summarizing empirical studies that showed that some prosecutors adjusted their practices to
avoid harsh mandatory penalties).
148. See David A. Sklansky & Stephen C. Yeazell, Comparative Law Without Leaving Home:
What Civil Procedure Can Teach Criminal Procedure, and Vice Versa, 94 GEO. L.J. 683, 696 (2006)
(noting prevalence of civil settlements, “a generally accepted and widely encouraged practice”).
149. Shawn D. Bushway et al., An Explicit Test of Plea Bargaining in the “Shadow of the Trial,”
52 CRIMINOLOGY, 723, 741 (2014); cf. Anna Offit, Prosecuting in the Shadow of the Jury, 113 NW. U.
L. REV. 1071 (2019) (concluding from ethnographic research that federal prosecutors internalize such
considerations in making case decisions).
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outcome.150 A defendant with this guidance could rationally trade away a
potential acquittal for prosecutorial concessions.151 The resulting plea bargaining
in the “shadow of trial” would uphold, rather than undermine, the law.152
Reliance on the “shadow-of-trial paradigm” does not unleash servant-ofthe-law prosecutors to pursue subjective conceptions of the “just” result. While
servant-of-the-law prosecutors could dismiss a provable charge to obtain a guilty
plea, they could not support a guilty plea to an offense for which there was no
factual or legal basis. Thus, unlike a prosecutor “doing justice,” a servant-of-thelaw prosecutor could not bargain for so-called “fictional pleas.”153 Just as
servant-of-the-law prosecutors cannot inflate charges for plea bargaining
leverage, they cannot endorse guilty pleas to lesser offenses that never occurred.
Servant-of-the-law prosecutors are limited to charging offenses supported by the
provable facts,154 and this obligation continues through guilty plea proceedings.
The servant-of-the-law prosecutor would also remain attentive to defenseprotective constitutional law during the plea bargaining process. The primary
rule in play will be the defendant’s right to effective assistance of counsel.155
But, as noted in Part II.B, prosecutors must also be cognizant of the pressure
certain plea offers place on a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to trial.
D. Prosecuting Cases
The preceding discussion fleshes out the prosecutorial calculus with respect
to the most important discretionary choices made by typical state and local
prosecutors: charging and plea bargaining. This Section discusses other
important procedural decisions.
Here, we can revisit the iconic Berger decision to consult the most
frequently cited guidance in this context.156 In Berger, the Supreme Court wrote
150. Bushway et al., supra note 149, at 741; Mona Lynch, Realigning Research: A Proposed
(Partial) Agenda for Sociolegal Scholars, 25 FED. SENT’G. REP. 254, 255 (2013) (describing research
that “revealed how routine criminal matters were resolved in reference to ‘going rates’ for different
offenses”).
151. Davis, supra note 1, at 43 (“Both the prosecutor and the defendant reap benefits from plea
bargaining.”); MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN A
LOWER CRIMINAL COURT 13 (1979) (“For [defendants] it is quite simply a rational decision, an
alternative which they have the full right to exercise.”).
152. See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV.
2464, 2467 (2004) (defining the “shadow-of-trial” model as plea bargains shaped “by the strength of the
evidence and the expected punishment after trial” and criticizing current plea bargaining practices for
deviating too often from that model).
153. See Thea Johnson, Fictional Pleas, 94 IND. L.J. 855, 855 (2019) (defining fictional pleas as
“one[s] in which a defendant pleads guilty to a crime he has not committed, with the knowledge of the
defense attorney, prosecutor, and judge”).
154. See supra Part II.B.
155. Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 162 (2012) (“During plea negotiations defendants are
‘entitled to the effective assistance of competent counsel.’”).
156. Lara A. Bazelon, Hard Lessons: The Role of Law Schools in Addressing Prosecutorial
Misconduct, 16 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 391, 398 (2011) (“We are all familiar with the Supreme Court’s
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that a prosecutor should “prosecute with earnestness and vigor”: “But, while he
may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his
duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful
conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one.”157
The imagery of a prosecutor striking “blows,” whether hard or foul, hints at an
underlying flaw. The ideal theory of the prosecutor’s role should not
conceptualize the prosecutor as a physical combatant. The only thing Berger
adds to this unhelpful metaphor is the directive that prosecutors refrain from
“improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction.”158 This is just
question begging. No one thinks that prosecutors should use “improper methods”
to obtain “wrongful convictions.”159 The question is what makes a method
“improper” and a conviction “wrongful”?
Again, Berger generates a nice billboard. But the famous language does no
work in filling out a theory of the prosecutor’s role. Similarly, Berger’s
exhortation that prosecutors vigorously strive to obtain “just” convictions does
little to answer procedural questions in particular cases. Justice rhetoric becomes
particularly problematic to the degree it suggests that prosecutors can deviate
from laws with which they disagree. It is one thing to say the prosecutor’s duty
to justice overrides fealty to the law in the charging or plea bargaining context.
It is quite another to cite justice as a trump of the prosecutor’s procedural
obligations. Yet, it is a small step from invoking prosecutorial discretion to
undermine a substantive law (e.g., marijuana possession or capital punishment)
to doing so to undermine a procedural one (e.g., a requirement to provide pretrial
discovery or notice to victims).
The search for concrete guidance again leads to the principle that
prosecutors must serve the law. As a servant of the law, the prosecutor’s role
extends beyond proving a case while adhering to applicable legal strictures. The
special supplemental obligation of this model is that prosecutors would work to
help other actors fulfill their legal duties. Berger cautions prosecutors not to kick
defense attorneys when they are down (“foul blows”). A servant of the law helps
struggling defense attorneys up so they can perform their legally mandated
roles.160
A non-combative prosecutorial mindset, more than any formal prescription,
may be the most valuable thing American legal systems can import from
continental Europe. The contrast is striking in one recent study of German

seventy-five-year-old admonition that ‘while [a prosecutor] may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to
strike foul ones.’”).
157. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
158. Id.
159. Cf. AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 98, at 18 (Standard 3-1.5 cmt.) (“In no event, however,
should a prosecutor participate or assist in the commission of illegal activity whatever the direction he
or she may have received from a supervisor.”).
160. Cf. Zacharias, supra note 26, at 49 (deriving from obligation to “do justice” that “prosecutors
must ensure that the basic elements of the adversary system exist at trial”).
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prosecutors—perhaps the closest real-world analogues to servant-of-the-law
prosecutors. Based on interviews, Shawn Boyne reports: German prosecutors
eschew “self-aggrandizing terms” and boasts of “individual achievements”; they
do not make “grand pronouncements about keeping society safe or getting
criminals off the streets.”161 “Unlike American prosecutors, German prosecutors
do not describe themselves as white knights or avenging angels . . . . A German
prosecutor does not ‘do battle’ in the courtroom, put the criminal ‘away,’ or
triumph over evil.”162
The idea of the prosecutor as a disinterested champion of the law contrasts
with the traditional American conception of the prosecutor as a zealous partisan.
For example, the ABA Criminal Justice Standards state that “[a] prosecutor is
not required to make a disinterested exposition of the law . . . .”163 But why not?
It is unclear what we gain by framing the criminal justice exercise as a game,
with prosecutors rooting for a particular team. Theoretically, by mixing an
adversarial prosecutor with equally adversarial defense attorneys, we get
justice.164 But the playing field is hardly level.165 And there are reasons to think
that ambiguity about the prosecutor’s role actually enhances their advantage.
Prosecutors don’t have to signal when they are acting as advocate and when they
are acting as a “minister of justice.” They can leverage this ambiguity with juries,
judges, and the public as they see fit.166
Servant-of-the-law prosecutors’ unique role comes into play not in the
fairness of the blows they deliver to defendants, but rather in careful attention to
preventing legal system failures. Thus, the discovery obligations that flow from
the servant-of-the-law model are broader than those currently recognized under
a “do justice” paradigm. A prosecutor seeking to serve the law will want the
defense to have all the information that the prosecutor possesses, i.e., open-file

161. SHAWN MARIE BOYNE, THE GERMAN PROSECUTION SERVICE: GUARDIANS OF THE LAW?
56 (2014).
162. Id. (internal citations omitted).
163. AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 98, at 36 (Standard 3-2.8 cmt.).
164. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (highlighting the critical role of the
defense attorney to “our adversary system of criminal justice”).
165. See Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, A National
Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1130 (2006) (documenting “the crisis of the American criminal justice
system in terms of providing lawyers for poor people”); Ronald F. Wright, Parity of Resources for
Defense Counsel and the Reach of Public Choice Theory, 90 IOWA L. REV. 219, 222 (2004) (explaining
that “[p]arity of resources is not the current reality in criminal justice funding”); Zacharias, supra note
26, at 59 (explaining ways in which “a prosecutor enjoys practical advantages over her adversaries”).
166. See United States v. Eley, 723 F.2d 1522, 1526 (11th Cir. 1984) (reviewing a challenge to a
prosecutor’s comment in closing argument that invoked the DOJ motto that “the United States wins
whenever justice is done”); Daniel Epps, Adversarial Asymmetry in the Criminal Process, 91 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 762, 783 (2016) (critiquing prosecutors’ neutrality); Zacharias, supra note 26, at 59 (“Because she
represents the community, she commonly carries more influence with juries than attorneys allied solely
with individual clients.”).
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discovery.167 The substantive laws demand punishment only for persons who are
factually guilty. Procedural laws assign attorneys to defendants to seek out and
present exculpatory information, and demand neutral factfinders to weigh the
evidence.168 The process dictated by the law only works when prosecutors
promptly pass along all case-related information to the defense. After all, a
prosecutor whose goal is to serve the law, not seek a conviction (or justice), has
little incentive to withhold information even when the specific jurisdiction’s
rules do not mandate disclosure.
The servant-of-the-law prosecutor’s unique obligations extend beyond
discovery. A defense attorney can celebrate when a judge dismisses a case
because the prosecutor forgot to subpoena an important witness. A servant-ofthe-law prosecutor faced with an analogous defense failure should suggest a
postponement, ensuring that the defendant receives “the effective assistance of
counsel” demanded by the Constitution.169 The prosecutor would internalize the
correct legal ruling when a trial judge fails to enforce the evidence rules or
defense counsel provides constitutionally ineffective representation, even if
doing so strengthens the likelihood of an acquittal. If a case depends on evidence
seized unlawfully, the prosecutor would dismiss the case, rather than wait to see
if the defense attorney and judge catch the constitutional violation. Although
such a dismissal may or may not comport with justice, it serves the law.
Another distinction will manifest at sentencing. Prosecutors on “a quest for
justice”170 can rationalize almost any sentence recommendation. Thus, an article
published in 2000 by the then-President of the National District Attorneys
Association suggests that a prosecutor should normally effectuate the call to “do
justice” by seeking “the most severe sentence allowed by law.”171 By contrast,
Philadelphia’s new District Attorney directs his prosecutors “to seek justice for
society as a whole” by asking for lower sentences that are sensitive to the
financial costs of incarceration.172 Servant-of-the-law prosecutors would not
seek specific sentences. (This was Department of Justice policy for many
years.)173 They would instead address pertinent mitigating and aggravating
167. Cf. Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 668–69 (1957) (“Because only the defense is
adequately equipped to determine the effective use for purpose of discrediting the Government’s witness
and thereby furthering the accused’s defense, the defense must initially be entitled to see them to
determine what use may be made of them. Justice requires no less.”); AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 98,
at 81 (Standard 3-3.11(a)) (“A prosecutor should not intentionally fail to make timely disclosure to the
defense, at the earliest feasible opportunity, of the existence of all evidence or information which tends
to negate the guilt of the accused . . . .”).
168. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (guaranteeing criminal defendants the right to counsel, the right
to compel witness testimony, and trial by an impartial jury).
169. See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970) (“It has long been recognized
that the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel.”).
170. NAT’L DIST. ATTORNEYS ASS’N, supra note 25, § 2-14 cmt.
171. Nat’l Dist. Attorneys Ass’n, supra note 34.
172. PHILADELPHIA DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, supra note 13, at 3.
173. See Simons, supra note 23, at 313 (quoting 1997 U.S. Attorneys’ Manual § 9-27.710–730
(1997)) (describing policy).
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factors, and inform the court of applicable laws. As servants of the law,
prosecutors would have no professional interest in a particular sentence, other
than that the sentence fall within the legal parameters.
A similar calculus applies to bail determinations. The law places pretrial
release determinations in the hands of the judge.174 Just as the prosecutor should
respect the determination of legislators as to what conduct is unlawful, the
prosecutor would defer to the law’s selection of judges as the arbiter of pretrial
release decisions and sentences.
A professional identity as a servant of the law would follow prosecutors
outside the courtroom. If conceived as “an independent administrator of
justice,”175 the prosecutor can sensibly seek to influence legislative policy. Both
the ABA176 and the National District Attorneys Association177 encourage
prosecutors to try to influence lawmakers to forward the cause of justice. Rachel
Barkow, who identifies prosecutors as “one of the most—if not the most—
powerful lobbying groups in criminal law,” makes a compelling case that
prosecutors use this power “to lobby for harsher sentences because longer
sentences make it easier for them to obtain convictions through plea
bargaining.”178 Others call on prosecutors to push legislators to enact progressive
reforms like eliminating harsh sentencing provisions and cash bail.179 By
contrast, prosecutor lobbying does not fit under a servant-of-the-law model.
Much like judges, servant-of-the-law prosecutors would adopt a professional
norm of only presenting unsolicited views to the legislature on matters directly
affecting their positions, such as office funding.180 The prosecutor who is serving
the law would leave advocacy for changes to that law to others.
174. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3142(a) (describing pretrial release requirements that can be imposed
by a “judicial officer”).
175. NAT’L DIST. ATTORNEYS ASS’N, supra note 25, ¶ 1-1.1 (“The primary responsibility of a
prosecutor is to seek justice.”).
176. See Criminal Justice Standards for the Prosecution Function, AM. BAR ASS’N (2017)
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/criminal_justice/standards/ProsecutionFunctionFourthEdition/
[https://perma.cc/3X9H-YFTN] (Section 3-1.2(f)).
177. NAT’L DIST. ATTORNEYS ASS’N, supra note 25, § 1-1 cmt. (“[A] prosecutor should take an
active role in the legislative process when proposals dealing with the criminal justice system are being
considered.”).
178. Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. REV. 715, 728 (2005) (“No other
group comes close to prosecutorial lobbying efforts on crime issues.”).
179. See Chiraag Bains, Looking in the Mirror: The Prosecutor’s Role in Ending Mass
Incarceration, 30 FED. SENT’G. REP. 197, 200 (2018) (urging prosecutors to lead reform efforts); R.
Michael Cassidy, (Ad)ministering Justice: A Prosecutor’s Ethical Duty to Support Sentencing Reform,
45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 981, 996–97 (2014) (“Prosecutors should thus feel ethically compelled to lend their
considerable expertise and political leadership to the emerging movement to repeal mandatory
sentences.”); Griffin & Yaroshefsky, supra note 97, at 314 (arguing that prosecutors should be
“advocating for repeal of mandatory minimum sentencing provisions for most drug and non-violent
offenses”); Rice, supra note 78 (“We should ask: Are prosecutors opposing new mandatory minimum
sentences during legislative debates?”).
180. See J. Jonas Anderson, Judicial Lobbying, 91 WASH. L. REV. 401, 416 (2016) (quoting
Justice Rehnquist’s 1993 Report on the Judiciary: “[W]hat is an appropriate sentence for a particular
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In sum, as a servant of the law, the prosecutor must give the law force even
when other actors fail to do so and even when doing so leads to dismissals and
acquittals. This prosecutor would be indifferent to winning a case, and zealous
only in ensuring that the laws are followed and the adjudicatory process created
by those laws functions properly.
III.
MOVING FROM DOING JUSTICE TO SERVING THE LAW
The previous Section sketches a servant-of-the-law model of prosecutorial
behavior as a potential alternative to “doing justice.” This Section discusses
whether the alternative is desirable. For all its flaws, the justice model provides
prosecutors with flexibility to do the right thing, as they perceive it. It may be
better to preserve this flexibility than to limit prosecutorial discretion with more
concrete guidance. To analyze the tradeoffs involved, this Section compares the
servant-of-the-law model to the “do justice” status quo in various categories of
decision-making: charging serious cases, dismissing minor cases, promoting
adherence to innocence-protective procedural rules, and incentivizing other
institutional actors to do justice.
A. Charging Serious Cases
With respect to charging and plea bargaining decisions in the most serious
cases, the move from a “do justice” to a servant-of-the-law model may not be
particularly disruptive. The servant-of-the-law model of charging set out in Part
II may even track existing state and local prosecutorial practices. This is because
charge selections at the state level are typically straightforward for the crimes
that matter most. In 2014, for example, prison populations reflected the
prioritization of common law offenses. In decreasing order of frequency, state
prisoners had been sentenced for Murder (13%), Robbery (12.8%), Rape
(12.4%), Aggravated/Simple Assault (10.2%), and Burglary (10.1%).181 Nonpossession drug offenses added another 12.2%.182 This short list of crimes
accounts for 70.7% of state prisoners. The other crimes that add smaller
percentages of prisoners, like Theft (3.6%), Fraud (2.3%), Weapons offenses
(3.94%), DWI (2.1%), and Motor vehicle theft (.8%), follow a similar pattern.183
At least with respect to cases that lead to incarceration, state prosecutors can
engage in straightforward charging calculations—matching the provable facts to
offense, and similar matters, are questions upon which a judge’s view should carry no more weight than
the view of any other citizen.”).
181. E. Ann Carson & Elizabeth Anderson, Prisoners in 2015, 14, tbl. 9, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS
BULLETIN
14
(Dec.
2016)
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p15.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7LQQ-CVSL].
182. Id.
183. Id.; see also Thomas H. Cohen & Tracey Kyckelhahn, Felony Defendants in Large Urban
Counties, 2006, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULL. 3, tbl. 1 (May 2010)
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fdluc06.pdf [https://perma.cc/HKL2-MQT7].
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easily recognized crimes. In this area, they may already act like servants of the
law.184 To the extent prosecutors deviate from this calculus, it is just as likely
that they are overcharging as undercharging.185
Many readers will resist the notion that the vast majority of American
prosecutors can or do exercise fairly routinized charging discretion. A central
claim of one of the most-cited criminal justice articles of all time is that it is not
legislators and judges, but “prosecutors, who are the criminal justice system’s
real lawmakers.”186 This notion, famously associated with the iconic Bill Stuntz,
guides modern academic discourse.187 Critically, though, when Stuntz turned his
lens to state and local prosecutors, the narrative changed. Consistent with the
above discussion, Stuntz described most serious crimes that come through state
prosecutors’ doors as “politically mandatory” in that there is no choice but to
prosecute.188 And recognizing the resource constraints on state (as opposed to
federal) prosecutors, Stuntz suggested that “there are enough of these politically
mandatory crimes to occupy all or nearly all of local prosecutors’ time and
manpower.”189
Stuntz’s description of state prosecutors suggests a servant-of-the-law
model might be neither radical nor disruptive. He writes: “For the state law
crimes that are punished most consistently—basically, FBI index crimes plus
distribution of serious drugs—state criminal law functions as law. . . .
[P]rosecutors prosecute these crimes systematically and aggressively, meaning
that, at least roughly, the crimes are enforced as written.”190 Prominent scholars
used to make similar points about the practical restrictions on the charging

184. See BRUCE FREDERICK & DON STEMEN, THE ANATOMY OF DISCRETION: AN ANALYSIS
PROSECUTORIAL
DECISION
MAKING
–
TECHNICAL
REPORT
60
(2012)
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/240334.pdf [https://perma.cc/6R7P-LHJW] (reporting that
“strength of the evidence” is the primary charging factor identified by prosecutors); cf. Stephen
Markman, Substantive Limitations on the Criminal Law: Random Thoughts of a Judicial Conservative,
in IN THE NAME OF JUSTICE 166 (Timothy Lynch ed., 2009) (“There is little in the everyday work of
the typical prosecutor in any one of Michigan’s 83 counties, with the possible exception of drug
prosecutions, that would upset most libertarians.”).
185. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
186. William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 506
(2001). Westlaw reports that the article has been cited over 850 times. It has been cited in “secondary
sources,” like law review articles, more often than the Supreme Court’s Berger decision.
187. See Miriam H. Baer, Choosing Punishment, 92 B.U. L. REV. 577, 632 (2012) (recognizing
“William Stuntz’s seminal article on overcriminalization, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law”);
Bellin, supra note 2, at 173–74 n.9 (tracing Stuntz’s influence); Todd Haugh, Overcriminalization’s
New Harm Paradigm, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1191, 1201 (2015) (explaining that “almost every scholar
working in the area draws on Stuntz”).
188. Richman & Stuntz, supra note 82, at 600.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 605.
OF
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discretion of prosecutors outside the federal context,191 although these
observations are often missing from modern accounts.192
The potential overlap between state criminal law on the books and current
prosecutorial enforcement practices is important. It suggests that a narrow
servant-of-the-law role for prosecutors may be both theoretically attractive and
a rough approximation of the status quo for serious offenses.193 That would mean
that the primary benefits (if any) of offering prosecutors a broad license to “do
justice” manifest during the prosecution of minor crimes. As discussed below,
there may be other ways to replicate these desirable aspects of prosecutorial
discretion without ceding so much amorphous discretion to prosecutors.
B. Dismissing Minor Cases and Diversion
While a servant-of-the-law model may track current charging practices for
serious cases, it likely deviates from those practices—for many prosecutors—for
less serious offenses. Due to societal ambivalence about the significance of
crimes such as drug possession, shoplifting, and prostitution, a prosecutor “doing
justice” can freely dismiss charges for those crimes, or craft ad hoc alternative
frameworks for disposing of those cases without a conviction. A prosecutor
serving the law would not enjoy the same freedom.
This is the context where a servant-of-the-law model will meet the most
resistance.194 Prosecutors’ offices increasingly embrace “diversion” programs
that reroute typically low-level cases to informal resolutions. Even the ABA
Standards for Criminal Justice, which shy away from any controversy,
unequivocally endorse diversion.195 (The ABA’s enthusiasm extends to
endorsing the threat of prosecution as a means to push suspects “to enter the

191. Id. (“[P]olitically accountable local district attorneys must spend the bulk of their time
enforcing a small number of serious crimes. Those crimes are defined nonstrategically. They must be
enforced, roughly, as written.”); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 401, 428 (1958) (describing the exercise of discretion by local prosecutors as consisting “largely
of making specifically professional, and inescapable, judgments”).
192. See Bellin, supra note 2 (chronicling academic overstatements of prosecutorial power).
193. Frederick & Stemen, supra note 184, at iii (reporting after empirical study of prosecutor
decisions that “prosecutors often rely on a fairly limited array of legal and quasi-legal factors to make
decisions”); John L. Worrall, Prosecution in America: A Historical and Comparative Account, in THE
CHANGING ROLE OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 3, 14 (John L. Worrall & M. Elaine NugentBorakove eds., 2008) (“Most prosecutors remain case processors.”).
194. See Bowers, supra note 51, at 1658 (“[T]he need for equitable discretion tends to rise as
crime severity falls.”); cf. Griffin & Yaroshefsky, supra note 97, at 321 (“[P]rosecutors should focus
more attention on . . . diversion for certain cases that are prosecuted.”); Erica McWhorter & David
LaBahn, Confronting the Elephants in the Courtroom Through Prosecutor Led Diversion Efforts, 79
ALB. L. REV. 1221, 1244 (2016) (encouraging prosecutors to “take the lead” in transforming
misdemeanor case processing through diversion programs).
195. See AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 98, at 69 (Standard 3-3.8(a)) (“The prosecutor should
consider in appropriate cases the availability of noncriminal disposition, formal or informal, in deciding
whether to press criminal charges which would otherwise be supported by probable cause . . . .”).
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military service.”196) The NDAA’s National Prosecution Standards similarly
endorse diversion programs if the prosecutor determines that “diversion of an
offender to a treatment alternative best serves the interests of justice.”197 The
Standards explain that diversion programs can “conserv[e] judicial resources for
more serious cases,” and reduce offender recidivism “by providing communitybased rehabilitation.”198
The servant-of-the-law model is not against diversion. But it eschews
lawlessness. Thus, a servant-of-the-law model would require prosecutors to
distinguish diversion programs created by legislatures (good) from those crafted
on an ad hoc basis by prosecutors (bad).199 In rough outlines, (bad) prosecutorcreated diversion programs work as follows.200 The police present a case to the
prosecutor. The prosecutor determines that the case is not worth prosecuting. But
rather than dismiss the case, the prosecutor requires the arrestee to jump through
a set of hoops.201 The hoops might include community service, drug treatment,
or counseling.202 Or, the sole requirement may be that the defendant avoid rearrest for a set period of time.203 The prosecutor then postpones the case pending
satisfaction of the requests.204 The programs are attractive to both prosecutors
and defendants because successful compliance results in a closed case. The
prosecutor conserves resources and the defendant avoids a conviction.
The servant-of-the-law model counsels against prosecutor-controlled
diversion programs. Once a prosecutor decides not to prosecute a case, this
model demands that the criminal justice system release the defendant from its
clutches. Whether the issue is lack of evidence, insufficient resources, or
compliance with a de minimis dismissal statute,205 the proper prosecutorial
196. Id. at 70 (Standard 3-3.8 cmt.) (“Another technique of long standing is for prosecutors not
to prosecute an offender who has agreed to enter the military service . . . .”).
197. NAT’L DIST. ATTORNEYS ASS’N, supra note 25, ¶ 4-3.1.
198. Id. ¶ 4-3 cmt.
199. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 703–04 (4th ed. 2004) (under
§ 13.6, contrasting diversion programs authorized by rules or statutes with “informal and often
haphazard” prosecutorial diversion programs).
200. For
examples,
see
City
of
Phx.,
Diversion
Programs,
https://www.phoenix.gov/law/prosecutor/diversion-programs [https://perma.cc/9PXL-JJKD] (last
visited Mar. 16, 2020) (noting that eligibility depends on the facts of the case, and that a “prosecutor
reviews all cases with diversion eligibility issues”); Third Judicial Dist. Attorney (New Mexico), PreProsecution and Diversion Program, http://donaanacountyda.com/pre-prosecution-and-diversionprogram/ [https://perma.cc/54CT-DAYD] (listing requirements for participation, including that subjects
abide by any “reasonable conditions as deemed necessary by the District Attorney’s Pre-Prosecution
Diversion Program”). For a comprehensive exploration of diversion programs, see Am. Bar Ass’n
Comm’n on Effective Criminal Sanctions, Report to the House of Delegates on Alternatives to
Incarceration and Conviction, 22 FED. SENT’G. REP. 62 (2009).
201. Andrew W. Lehren et al., The Prosecutor’s Deal, the Defendant’s Dilemma, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 12, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/12/12/us/law-quiz-criminal-justice.html
[https://perma.cc/BE3G-UQP4] (“Your eligibility will depend almost entirely on your prosecutor.”).
202. See supra notes 196–197 and accompanying text .
203. See Bellin, supra note 2, at 1.
204. Id.
205. See infra notes 217–218 and accompanying text.
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response would be dismissal. Period. Although many defendants no doubt
benefit from services they encounter through diversion programs, prosecutors
should not be the gatekeepers to these forms of assistance. And while these
programs are often viewed as hallmarks of progressive prosecution,206 there is
no guarantee that they function in this manner. The coercive force of the criminal
justice system powers diversion programs. A defendant who enters drug court,
for example, may end up serving more jail time than a similarly situated
defendant who rejects the program.207 This is particularly true if prosecutors
divert weaker cases as a politically expedient alternative to dismissals.208
Diversion is always an attractive option. So attractive, in fact, that it is likely that
some nontrivial percentage of defendants working their way through diversion
programs were not, and would never have been found, guilty.209
The same concerns about unguided, justice-based discretion in other
contexts resurface with diversion. Indeed, these concerns are not just theoretical.
A 2016 New York Times report on 225 prosecution-run diversion programs in 37
states found widespread abuses, including that “in many places, only people with
money” can afford to participate.210 The article explained, “Prosecutors exert
almost total control over diversion, deciding who deserves mercy and at what
price . . . .”211
The inconsistency between the servant-of-the-law prosecutor and
prosecutor-driven diversion programs does not mean that the use of diversion
must be reduced. There is no particular magic to prosecutor-controlled diversion
programs. These programs’ only real selling point is that they are relatively
cheap and easy to create. Ad hoc prosecutor-driven programs can be
206. See McWhorter & LaBahn, supra note 194, at 1244.
207. FEELEY, supra note 151, at 234 (reporting that the New Haven pretrial diversion program
“increases rather than decreases the harshness of the criminal process”); Josh Bowers, Contraindicated
Drug Courts, 55 UCLA L. REV. 783, 792 (2008) (explaining that studies of New York drug courts
“found that the sentences for failing participants in New York City drug courts were typically two-tofive times longer than the sentences for conventionally adjudicated defendants”).
208. Mae C. Quinn, Whose Team Am I on Anyway? Musings of a Public Defender About Drug
Treatment Court Practice, 26 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 37, 58 (2001) (highlighting “the potential
for prosecutors to use treatment court as a place to ‘dump’ weak cases” and noting the difficulties faced
by defense attorneys in convincing clients to refuse a referral to drug court in such circumstances).
209. See id.; cf. Bowers, supra note 207, at 788 (“[W]hen drug courts imprison failing
participants, they punish them not for their underlying crimes, but for their inability to get with the
program.”).
210. Shaila Dewan & Andrew W. Lehren, After a Crime, the Price of a Second Chance, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 12, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/12/us/crime-criminal-justice-reformdiversion.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/Z56V-HYDU].
211. Id.; see also State v. Long Fox, 832 N.W.2d 55, 60 (Konenkamp, J., concurring)
(highlighting “the void in our law governing deferred prosecutions” by stating “deferred prosecution
agreements in South Dakota have no standards, no guidelines for eligibility, and no formalized
procedures authorized by legislation. They operate informally and purely at prosecutorial discretion.”);
Michael Gordon, Yes, Rich People Have a Better Chance of Getting Off in Court, Public Defender Says,
THE CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (Sept. 22, 2017), http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/politicsgovernment/article174707216.html [https://perma.cc/6HWL-H7H4] (reporting that offenders were
required to pay restitution before entering diversion program).
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reconstructed, more comprehensively, through legislative action. And unlike
prosecutor-controlled programs, statutory diversion can come with
appropriations that override financial barriers to participation, and grant other
officials, such as judges, de facto gatekeeping power. For example, a District of
Columbia law allows trial judges to defer proceedings against a person convicted
of a narcotics offense for up to a year, and at the end of the period, dismiss the
case without a conviction.212 The statute then provides for expungement of the
official record.213
Legislatures can enact more diversion programs and broaden programs
already in existence.214 Servant-of-the-law prosecutors would play an active role
in these statutory diversion programs. Their role would be to ensure that qualified
defendants are funneled to diversion programs according to statutory entry
criteria. To the extent statutes mandate prosecutorial approval as one of the
criteria, prosecutors should simply approve all requests for entry so long as the
defendant meets the other eligibility criteria.215 Police departments can also fill
the void, diverting arrestees from the adjudicative process even earlier in the
process.216
Servant-of-the-law prosecutors could also sidestep diversion entirely and
dismiss minor cases pursuant to de minimis dismissal statutes, already present in
nineteen states.217 These statutes authorize the dismissal of the types of cases that
typically wind up in diversion programs. As Anna Roberts explains, de minimis
“statutes are not about the legal or factual merits of a prosecution, or about guilt
or innocence, but are about a determination that while the case is permitted in
criminal court, it should not be pursued.”218 In jurisdictions with de minimis
statutes, servant-of-the-law prosecutors would regularly dismiss diversion-type
cases—either pursuant to statutory direction or in anticipation of judicial
dismissals—with no strings attached.

212. D.C. CODE § 48-904.01(e)(1-2) (2019); see also Pernell v. United States, 771 A.2d 992, 999
(D.C. 2001) (Ruiz, J., dissenting) (“[This section’s] application bestows important benefits that go
beyond the outcome of the immediate criminal proceeding and can have an impact on a person’s
subsequent activities in school, employment, etc.”). Virginia courts have found inherent authority to
create de facto diversion programs by postponing judgment and then, if certain conditions are met,
dismissing them without ever entering a conviction. See Starrs v. Commonwealth, 752 S.E.2d 812, 819
(Va. 2014).
213. D.C. CODE § 48-904.01(e)(1-2) (2019); see Margaret Colgate Love, Alternatives to
Conviction: Deferred Adjudication as a Way of Avoiding Collateral Consequences, 22 FED. SENT’G.
REP. 6, 7 (2009) (describing similar programs in other jurisdictions).
214. Love, supra note 213, at 7 (“Deferred adjudication schemes are statutorily authorized in
over half the states.”).
215. See supra Part II.B (arguing for a prosecutorial discretion version of the rule of lenity when
legislatures dictate choices without guidance).
216. See What is LEAD?, LEAD NAT’L SUPPORT BUREAU, https://www.leadbureau.org/aboutlead [https://perma.cc/3T5H-GX4J].
217. Anna Roberts, Dismissals as Justice, 69 ALA. L. REV. 327, 330 (2017).
218. Id. at 336
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Finally, prosecutors of all stripes will decline to prosecute a subset of minor
offenses to focus finite court and prosecutorial resources on the most serious
crimes.219
C. Promoting Adherence to the Rules and Protecting the Innocent
The previous Sections address changes in charging practices that would
follow from a transition to a “servant-of-the-law” model. This Section looks at
whether retiring Berger’s age-old guidance sacrifices anything outside of the
charging context. Two wide-ranging benefits of the “do justice” exhortation are
its implicit directions that prosecutors: (1) respect legal rules, and (2) protect the
innocent. As explained below, these benefits are only enhanced by a servant-ofthe-law model.
Commentators sometimes invoke the prosecutor’s duty to “do justice” as if
it were independent authority requiring prosecutors to follow legal rules.220 But
the courts do not actually use the “do justice” command in this manner.221 They
don’t need to. Prosecutors, like everyone else, must comply with the rules of
evidence, trial procedure, and discovery.222 That is the way to understand Berger
v. United States itself, where the prosecutor transgressed generally applicable
rules of trial procedure.223 When prosecutors breach a rule, it is that rule, not
their obligation to “do justice,” that provides a remedy. State prosecutors, for
example, must turn over exculpatory evidence.224 But this is not because they
have a duty to “do justice.” Instead, prosecutors must comply with the
requirements of Brady v. Maryland because failure to do so results in “a violation
of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”225 If anything, the
“do justice” command undermines the clarity of the principle that prosecutors
must follow the rules. For example, the NDAA’s National Prosecution Standards
assert that there may be circumstances where “a prosecutor chooses to disregard
a code or rule because of a belief that his or her duty to seek justice requires the
same.”226 By contrast, asking prosecutors to conceptualize their roles as servants
of the law strengthens the directive that they comply with the rules governing
their own conduct.
219. See supra Part II.C.
220. See, e.g., Scott E. Sundby, Fallen Superheroes and Constitutional Mirages: The Tale of
Brady v. Maryland, 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 643, 644 (2002) (noting the view that the Brady decision
requiring disclosure of exculpatory evidence “embodied the prosecutor’s ethical duty to pursue
‘justice’”).
221. Id.; see also United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110 (1976) (“If the suppression of evidence
results in constitutional error, it is because of the character of the evidence, not the character of the
prosecutor.”).
222. See, e.g., Carter v. State, 738 N.E.2d 665, 672 (Ind. 2000) (discussing prosecutor’s
obligation to follow local discovery rules).
223. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 89 (1935) (“the misconduct of the prosecuting attorney
. . . was pronounced and persistent . . . .”).
224. Brady v. State of Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86 (1963).
225. Id.
226. NAT’L DIST. ATTORNEYS ASS’N, supra note 25, Commentary to § 1-1.
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Another potential benefit of the “do justice” command is that it prompts
prosecutors to care about a defendant’s potential innocence. While the content
of justice is debated, one point of general agreement is that it is unjust to punish
people for crimes they did not commit.227 Again, however, this same principle
can be derived from a solemn focus on the law. The criminal laws dictate
punishment only for those guilty of violating their terms. If, for example, the law
provides a severe punishment for murder, it is inconsistent with that law to
impose that penalty on someone who did not commit the offense. In addition, as
already discussed in Part II.D, the servant-of-the-law model nudges prosecutors
to effectuate procedural law, including many innocence-protective rules. Unlike
the adversarial champion of justice, a servant-of-the-law prosecutor must
facilitate the defense and judicial functions, enhancing judges and defense
attorneys’ ability to protect the innocent.
D. Pushing Other Institutions to Do Justice
One of the clearest costs of the “do justice” model of the prosecutorial role
is that it creates ambiguity about what prosecutors should be doing. This
ambiguity obscures the capacity of other criminal justice actors to do justice—
and prevents voters and other observers from holding government officials
accountable for perceived injustices. This Section discusses how the clarity of a
servant-of-the-law theory of the prosecutorial role interacts with, and could
improve, the actions of other criminal justice actors.228
The most significant potential impact of reconceptualizing prosecutors as
servants of the law would be on the legislature. With respect to setting forth the
criminal law, the prosecutor acting as a servant of the law defers to the
legislature.229 The prosecutor would not override the legislature’s determination
of what conduct is unlawful, and how it should be punished. In his
groundbreaking study of discretion, Kenneth Culp Davis makes this point in
describing the role of the police: “When a legislative body enacts that an act is a
crime, . . . police nonenforcement on the ground that the enactment is unwise
seems clearly an unlawful assumption of power. When administrations flagrantly
violate clear statutory provisions, they reject the central idea of the rule of
law.”230 The usual response to Culp Davis is that mechanical application of law
will often be too harsh and therefore unjust. A shift from a “do justice” to a

227. See Joshua Dressler, Hating Criminals: How Can Something That Feels So Good Be
Wrong?, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1448, 1451 (1990) (“Negative retributivism, accepted by many or perhaps
most scholars, holds . . . that it is morally wrong to punish an innocent person even if society might
benefit from the action.”).
228. Hart, supra note 191, at 402 (“[E]ach agency of decision must take account always of its
own place in the institutional system and of what is necessary to maintain the integrity and workability
of the system as a whole.”).
229. Id. at 428 (asserting that prosecuting attorneys “have a lesser role to play, accordingly, in
the conscious shaping of the aims of the criminal law”).
230. Culp Davis, supra note 55, at 87.
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“servant-of-the-law” paradigm, however, does not mean that justice-related
concerns would be banished from the criminal justice system. In fact, justice,
broadly conceived, might be achieved more consistently as other criminal justice
actors emerge from the prosecutor’s shadow.
With the prosecutor’s role clarified, a more natural focus on the legislature
and judiciary to do justice would emerge. A German law professor explaining
how the German system of “compulsory prosecution”231 differs from the United
States’ adversarial model makes these points:
Citizens are protected against unjust convictions and oppressive
punishments by the Penal Code rather than by individual prosecuting
attorneys. . . . [T]here is general agreement in Germany that the Penal
Code must be amended, rather than the polices of the prosecutor altered,
if the administration of the criminal law produces undesired
results. . . . German law relies on careful and elaborate judicial
interpretation of the substantive law to solve problems that the United
States often leaves to the discretion of the prosecutor.232
The various marijuana legalization mechanisms spreading across the country are
a modern American illustration of this dichotomy. In some jurisdictions, states
decriminalize marijuana possession through popular referenda or legislative
action.233 In other jurisdictions, prosecutors seek to achieve a roughly equivalent
policy outcome through charging policies.234 Obviously, state-wide referenda
and legislation are more comprehensive and enduring means to change drug
policy. Prosecutor policies only apply within the prosecutor’s local jurisdiction,
are non-binding, can change at any time, and do not prevent police from
continuing to make arrests for drug offenses.235 In fact, prosecutors’ wellintended efforts could, paradoxically, short circuit broader reforms by relieving
political pressure in jurisdictions where opposition to drug laws is most acute.236
A servant-of-the-law model will also bring out a greater case-sorting role
for, or simply highlight the existing role of, the police. This is because even as
231. The rigidity of this constraint on German prosecutors historically, and over time, is a subject
of debate. See Shawn Boyne, Is the Journey from the In-Box to the Out-Box a Straight Line? The Drive
for Efficiency and the Prosecution of Low-Level Criminality in Germany, in THE PROSECUTOR IN
TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 37, 39 (Erik Luna & Marianne L. Wade eds., 2012) (“This vision of
German prosecution practice as a function of the law on the books, rather than organizational incentives,
proves to be anachronistic, if not obsolete.”).
232. Joachim Herrmann, The Rule of Compulsory Prosecution and the Scope of Prosecutorial
Discretion in Germany, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 468, 470–72 (1974).
233. See Marijuana Overview, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Oct. 17, 2019),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/marijuana-overview.aspx
[https://perma.cc/H9K2-AA52] (describing legalization procedures in eleven states and the District of
Columbia, through public votes or legislative action).
234. See supra note 13 (examples in Introduction).
235. See Bellin, supra note 2; Ronald F. Wright, Sentencing Commissions as Provocateurs of
Prosecutorial Self-Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1010, 1024 n.58 (2005) (discussing resistance to
the use of prosecutorial guidelines as the basis of enforceable rights for defendants).
236. The same phenomenon occurs when prosecutors’ diversion programs occupy the space of
more comprehensive, legislatively created versions that would limit rather than empower prosecutors.
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the laws improve, lawmakers cannot anticipate every scenario. The “rule of law”
necessarily involves discretion. No matter where power to enforce the law
resides, it will incorporate a power not to act. That “negative power” is
particularly ungovernable when delegated to numerous individuals like police
officers or local prosecutors.237
Yet just as there will always be discretion, that discretion will always be
exercised in the first instance by the police. As Culp Davis recognized—and
contrary to modern academic thought—it is local police, not prosecutors, who
wield the greatest discretion in the American criminal justice system.238 Police
(not prosecutors) conduct stings, make traffic stops, and respond to 911 calls.
Prosecutors, by contrast, have little ability to detect crime. Thus, a speeding
motorist can get off with a warning, a public drunk can be sent home in a cab,
and a bellicose teenager can be lectured, not jailed. A group of co-workers in a
college basketball “March Madness” pool need not be dragged into court to face
gambling and tax evasion charges. Yet none of these mercies come about
because we give broad discretion to prosecutors. These decisions are typically
made by police.239 This is the case in Germany, perhaps the closest example of
something like a servant-of-the-law model. While the German prosecutor
possesses some discretionary power to decline to prosecute minor cases, this
comes up infrequently: “In practice, the job of exercising discretion in these
cases is performed by the police.”240 This means that in conceptualizing a role
for prosecutors, we need not decide whether to create a discretionary screen
between technical law violations and formal court action. The question is what
we gain (and lose) by telling prosecutors to re-evaluate a question—is a
particular infraction worth prosecuting?—already answered by local police.
Even if police were not already making these decisions, they are the more
logical official to take on the role. Local police are closer to the context of an
offense, its role in society, and the likely impacts of legal intervention on the
individuals involved. Unlike prosecutors, police come into regular contact with
offenders, victims, and witnesses, developing a deeper sense of which cases and
persons warrant formal intervention. This is particularly true for assessing a
particular defendant’s culpability or remorse. The American adversarial system
maintains an almost sacred separation between the prosecutor and a criminal
defendant.241 Unlike a police officer, the prosecutor is “isolated from those—the

237. Culp Davis, supra note 55, at 188 (exploring challenge).
238. See Bellin, supra note 2, at 191 (exploring ways in which police possess even more
discretion than prosecutors); Culp Davis, supra note 55, at 8 (“Among the most important administrators
in America are the police—all 420,000 of them. They make some of our most crucial policies and a
large portion of their function is the administration of justice to individual parties.”).
239. See BAKER, supra note 75, at 47 (quoting a prosecutor’s observation that “[o]ther agencies
have already filtered out the problems with relatively easy solutions” before cases get to prosecutors’
offices).
240. Herrmann, supra note 232, at 484.
241. See Fisher, supra note 4, at 208.
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defendant, his family and friends, and often, his witnesses—who might arouse
the prosecutor’s empathy or stimulate concern for treating him fairly.”242
Of course, any discretionary screening decision in the American criminal
justice system raises concerns about racial bias and other pernicious factors.243
But there is no reason to expect prosecutors to be preferable to police in this
respect.244 In fact, with respect to important demographic factors, such as race,
police departments are far more diverse than prosecutor offices.245
Another reason to push discretionary, community-oriented determinations
through a police filter is that the broadest justice-related screen should happen as
early as possible. If legal intervention is not warranted, prosecutorial dismissals
come too late. It is preferable that persons not be arrested than be arrested, jailed,
and later have their case dismissed.246 Malcolm Feeley famously explained that
for minor offenses, “the process itself becomes the punishment”; but that was an
indictment of the system, not an endorsement.247
None of this means that servant-of-the-law prosecutors must prosecute
every case brought to them by the police. But it does narrow the prosecutor’s
screening role. The most compelling reason to have the prosecutor re-screen a
case selected for prosecution by police is that prosecutors, unlike police, are
formally trained in the law. While a police officer might decide that an offense
is worth pursuing from a community “protect and serve” standpoint, the

242. Id. See generally Matter of Howes, 940 P.2d 159, 162 (N.M. 1997) (issuing public censure
and costs upon prosecutor for violating bar rules by listening to communications from a defendant); Ben
Kempinen, The Ethics of Prosecutor Contact with the Unrepresented Defendant, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 1147 (2006). There may also be functional distinctions in the prosecutor and police role that
favor police in this context. See Kay L. Levine, The New Prosecution, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1125,
1130 (2005) (highlighting comparative advantages of police over prosecutors at community caretaking
functions).
243. See Davis, supra note 1, at 5.
244. See Sunita Sah et al., Blinding Prosecutors to Defendants’ Race: A Policy Proposal to
Reduce Unconscious Bias in the Criminal Justice System, 1 BEHAV. SCI. & POL’Y 69, 70 (2015) (“A
recent review of empirical studies examining prosecutorial decision making and race found that most of
the studies suggested that the defendants’ ‘race directly or indirectly influenced case outcomes, even
when a host of other legal or extra-legal factors are taken into account.’”).
245. See KATHERINE J. BIES ET AL., STANFORD CRIM. JUST. CTR., STUCK IN THE ‘70S: THE
DEMOGRAPHICS
OF
CALIFORNIA
PROSECUTORS
6
(2015),
https://media.law.stanford.edu/organizations/programs-and-centers/scjc/Stuck-in-the-70s-FinalReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/CH4Q-DNVF] (documenting lack of diversity among prosecutors); David
Alan Sklansky, Not Your Father’s Police Department: Making Sense of the New Demographics of Law
Enforcement, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1209, 1210 (2006) [hereinafter Sklansky, Not Your
Father’s Police Department] (“The virtually all-white, virtually all-male departments of the 1950s and
1960s have given way to departments with large numbers of female and minority officers, often led by
female or minority chiefs.”); David Alan Sklansky, The Progressive Prosecutor’s Handbook, 50 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. ONLINE 25, 41 (2017) [hereinafter Sklansky, The Progressive Prosecutor’s Handbook]
(“Prosecutors’ offices lag behind police departments in this regard, at least with respect to race and
ethnicity.”).
246. See generally ISSA KOHLER-HAUSMANN, MISDEMEANORLAND (2018) (documenting
enormous burdens placed on defendants whose cases are eventually dismissed in New York City’s
misdemeanor courts).
247. FEELEY, supra note 151, at 201.
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prosecutor could detect legal or evidentiary flaws in the case that preclude
prosecution. Employing typical tools of statutory construction, including
prioritizing legislative intent over text,248 declining to enforce impermissibly
vague laws,249 and the rule of lenity,250 a prosecutor might determine that a case
that technically fits a criminal statute should not be pursued. For example, the
teenager who texts a picture of herself to a friend while handing him a marijuana
joint could be charged with distributing both child pornography and drugs. The
prosecutor’s decision to drop the charges would not constitute nullification, but
application of the intent of the law over the literal text—a mainstream
interpretive philosophy251—particularly in light of constitutional constraints.252
One might object that this function overlaps too closely with what judges do. But
there are good reasons to ask prosecutors to mirror judges under a servant-ofthe-law model. Perhaps the most compelling reason is that, in a system where
cases are typically resolved prior to trial,253 a legal screen that would ideally be
applied by judges must be delegated elsewhere. Finally, as already explained in
Part III.B, many provable cases will be channeled to statutory diversion
programs or dismissed entirely to allow prosecutors serving the law to focus
finite resources on the most legally serious cases.
IV.
CAN PROGRESSIVE PROSECUTORS SERVE THE LAW?
The previous Sections introduced the servant-of-the-law model of
prosecution and analyzed the implications of moving toward that model and
away from “doing justice.” This Section addresses the desirability of a servantof-the-law approach in the current criminal justice moment. Prosecutors
constrained by the law may be attractive in the abstract, but a bolder theory of
the prosecutorial role may be needed in a country with broad criminal laws and
unprecedented incarceration levels. Why not employ every possible tool,
248. See Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 454 (1989) (“Where the literal
reading of a statutory term would ‘compel an odd result,’ . . . we must search for other evidence of
congressional intent to lend the term its proper scope.”) (internal citation omitted).
249. See Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2556–57 (2015) (“The prohibition of
vagueness in criminal statutes ‘is a well-recognized requirement, consonant alike with ordinary notions
of fair play and the settled rules of law,’ and a statute that flouts it ‘violates the first essential of due
process.’”).
250. See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347 (1971) (“[A]mbiguity concerning the ambit of
criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity.”) (citing Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S.
385, 391 (1926)).
251. See John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2388 (2003)
(“From the earliest days of the Republic, the Supreme Court has subscribed to the idea that judges may
deviate from even the clearest statutory text when a given application would otherwise produce ‘absurd’
results.”).
252. See Amy Forliti, Judge Dismisses ‘Absurd’ Case Against Minnesota Teen Who ‘Sexted’
Boy, ASSOCIATED PRESS (March 16, 2018), https://www.twincities.com/2018/03/16/judge-dismissesabsurd-case-against-minnesota-teen-who-sexted-boy/ [https://perma.cc/BA4U-AY3G].
253. See Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 143 (2012) (“Ninety-seven percent of federal
convictions and ninety-four percent of state convictions are the result of guilty pleas.”).
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including raw prosecutorial power in the form of “progressive prosecution,” to
counteract the criminal justice system’s severity?254 As this Section explains,
there is little inherent tension between a servant-of-the-law model and
progressive prosecution. In fact, this model could provide much-needed
theoretical grounding for evolving perceptions of the ideal prosecutor.
Progressive prosecution holds great appeal for reformers seeking to undo
mass incarceration. A progressive prosecutor can dismiss cases to nullify unjust
laws; counteract racial and socioeconomic imbalances in police enforcement or
legislative drafting; defang the most severe punishments by declining to trigger
them; and aggressively prosecute certain under-prosecuted crimes to promote
broad policy goals.255 This progressive wish-list sounds like a challenge to a
servant-of-the-law paradigm. In fact, the most concrete aspects of progressive
prosecution fit well with a servant-of-the-law model.
Again, we should begin with charging, the most important prosecutorial
task. Discussions of progressive prosecution do not typically include a charging
standard. But it is difficult to construct a progressive charging standard that
would differ significantly from the proposal in Parts II.A and B. Prosecutors,
progressive or otherwise, can discern the appropriate charge by matching the
readily provable facts to statutorily defined offenses. Importantly, the proposed
charging standard captures the progressive intuition that prosecutors should not
charge a more severe offense to obtain plea bargaining leverage. Progressive
icon Larry Krasner’s recent explanation of the charging practices in his office
mirror this standard: “We are going to proceed on charges that are supported by
the facts in the case, period. The era of trying to get away with the highest charge
regardless of the facts is over.”256 Another authority in the progressive
prosecution movement provides similar guidance: “Don’t make a plea offer if

254. See Davis, supra note 33, at 1085 (“As ministers of justice, prosecutors have an ethical duty
to take action to correct injustices in the criminal justice system.”); Cassidy, supra note 179, at 983
(“Prosecutors have a duty . . . to think about the delivery of criminal justice on a systemic level,
promoting criminal justice policies that further broader societal ends.”); Alexes Harris, Justice Shouldn’t
Come
With
a
$250
Fine,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Jan.
3,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/03/opinion/alternative-justice-fines-prosecutors.html
[https://perma.cc/T4A6-YQ92] (“New prosecutors have the power to stop coloring within the lines of
our unjust, unfair and unrealistic systems of justice.”).
255. See Bruce Green, Urban Policing and Public Policy — The Prosecutor’s Role, 51 GA. LAW
REV. 1179, 1199 (2017) (arguing that prosecutorial discretion “can serve as a check on bad legislative
decisions”); K. Babe Howell, Prosecutorial Discretion and the Duty to Seek Justice in an Overburdened
Criminal Justice System, 27 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 285, 288 (2014) (calling on “prosecutors’ offices to
respond to and ameliorate the disparate impact and failure of the justice system caused by policing of
minor offenses”); David Alan Sklansky, The Changing Political Landscape for Elected Prosecutors, 14
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 647, 655–56 (2017) (noting that Baltimore District Attorney Marilyn Mosby, who
campaigned on a promise “to be more aggressive in seeking charges against police officers,” was
criticized for having “moved too quickly and overcharged” the officers involved in death of Freddie
Gray, even though the questionable charges “helped to calm Baltimore in the wake of Gray’s death”).
256. Ewing, supra note 114.
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you can’t prove the charge beyond a reasonable doubt.”257 These sentiments fit
neatly with a servant-of-the-law, not a “do justice,” model.258 In addition, as
explained in Part II.B, progressive prosecutors could embrace the latitude the
servant-of-the-law theory offers by defaulting to the less severe alternative
whenever legislators provide choices without guidance.259
The most likely point of contention between servants of the law and
progressive prosecutors will arise when the latter reject certain disfavored laws.
But there is a critical difference between viewing certain charges through a more
skeptical lens and rejecting them out of hand. For example, Rachael Rollins, the
newly elected District Attorney of Suffolk County (Boston), generated buzz
among progressives with her “plan to forgo prosecution of 15 offenses, ranging
from trespassing to drug possession with intent to distribute.”260 Similar
sentiments appear throughout the progressive prosecution movement.261 But
typically, progressive guidance does not reject offenses outright. As Rollins
herself emphasizes, her “list ‘is not a blanket commitment.’” Instead, Rollins’s
actual proposal is that prosecutions for certain less serious offenses require
supervisory approval262—something that is required for any charge in many
jurisdictions where supervisors screen all initial charging decisions.263 Rollins
herself stresses that her do-not-prosecute list is not radical: “It’s about
memorializing what is already happening in the majority of cases.”264
General guidance to avoid prosecutions of minor offenses fits into a
tradition of American prosecutors responding to resource constraints by
declining cases presented to them by police.265 Minor crimes that are extremely
common, like drug possession, trespassing, and loitering, provide the most
obvious opportunity for prosecutors to conserve resources. Limiting prosecution
257. FAIR AND JUST PROSECUTION, 21 PRINCIPLES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY PROSECUTOR 5
(2018), https://fairandjustprosecution.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/FJP_21Principles_Interactivew-destinations.pdf [https://perma.cc/6NDW-8ENH].
258. See supra Part II.B.
259. See supra Parts II.B (charging and enhancements); II.C (diversion).
260. Maria Cramer, DA Candidate Rachael Rollins Hailed Nationally, But Locally Her Plan Not
to Prosecute Petty Crimes Alarms Some, BOS. GLOBE (Sept. 12, 2018),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2018/09/12/candidate-hailed-nationally-but-locally-her-plan-notprosecute-petty-crimes-alarms-some/pyQX8MT4iWpyJ8XMi6SsFO/story.html
[https://perma.cc/J3PC-8SVQ]; Rachael Rollins, SUFFOLK DIST. ATTORNEY, Charges to be Declined,
https://rollins4da.com/policy/charges-to-be-declined/ [https://perma.cc/4G9G-7AUZ] (listing offenses).
261. See FAIR AND JUST PROSECUTION, supra note 257, at 10 (“In general, do not charge
misdemeanors, such as trespassing or loitering, which are associated with poverty, mental illness, and
homelessness.”); id. at 11 (“In general, do not charge sex workers or clients when both parties are over
18 and consent.”).
262. Rollins, supra note 260.
263. See Paul T. Crane, Charging on the Margin, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 775, 797 (2016)
(“One common practice, especially in larger offices, is to designate a group of prosecutors as having
primary responsibility for screening incoming cases and making charging decisions.”); Ronald Wright
& Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 STAN. L. REV. 29, 63 (2002) (“All attorneys in
the Screening Section served previously (usually a couple of years) in the Trial Section.”).
264. Cramer, supra note 260.
265. See Bellin, supra note 3, at 846–47 (discussing empirical data on prosecutorial dismissals).
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of these crimes also fits neatly into a servant-of-the-law paradigm. These
offenses are among the least severely punished by legislatures and judges and
yet, due to their volume, have the potential to clog court dockets. Prosecutors
faced with inevitable resource constraints serve the law by declining to prosecute
these offenses, enabling a tighter focus on more significant offenses. Progressive
prosecutors may dismiss more minor offenses than non-progressive prosecutors,
but apart from the rhetoric surrounding those decisions, the distinction is one of
degree rather than kind.
Other attributes of the servant-of-the-law framework fit even more squarely
within the progressive prosecution movement. Providing broad discovery to
criminal defendants,266 applying the law to crimes committed by police
officers,267 dismissing cases that rely on thin or questionable evidence,268 and
taking claims of innocence seriously269 all fit neatly into a servant-of-the-law
paradigm.
Anchoring the evolving ideal of the prosecutorial role in a theoretical
framework provides a variety of benefits. By embracing a servant-of-the-law
model, progressive prosecutors could ground their reforms in a rule-of-law
paradigm that will appeal across the political spectrum, including to line
prosecutors, police, and legislators. At a more general level, there are benefits to
tying prosecutors, including those leading the progressive prosecution
movement, to an overarching theory of prosecution. A rubric that places some
theoretical parameters on prosecutorial freedom resists the inexorable extension
of “the prosecutor’s empire.”270 For decades, reformers railed against the evils
of unbounded prosecutorial discretion.271 In one of the more influential
treatments, Angela Davis contended that “everyday, legal exercise of
prosecutorial discretion is largely responsible for the tremendous injustices in
our criminal justice system.”272 The compelling concerns about prosecutorial
discretion expressed in longstanding academic critiques do not vanish when the
discretion is (occasionally) used in a favored direction.273 To the contrary, the
absence of a normative theory of the prosecutorial role enhances the dangers of
266. FAIR AND JUST PROSECUTION, supra note 257, at 17; Sklansky, The Progressive
Prosecutor’s Handbook, supra note 245, at 33 (“Have a clear, generous, and administrable disclosure
policy.”); see also supra Part II.D.
267. See FAIR AND JUST PROSECUTION, supra note 257, at 19; Sklansky, The Progressive
Prosecutor’s Handbook, supra note 245, at 38 (“Investigate police shootings independently and
transparently.”); supra Parts II.A & B.
268. Supra Parts II.A & B.
269. See Sklansky, The Progressive Prosecutor’s Handbook, supra note 245, at 32 (encouraging
prosecutor’s offices to make space for “objectively reviewing claims of wrongful conviction”).
270. Levine, supra note 242, at 1211.
271. See Davis, supra note 1; Gershowitz, supra note 1; Bibas, supra note 37; Reiss, supra note
37.
272. Davis, supra note 1, at 17.
273. Cf. Norman W. Spaulding, The Rule of Law in Action: A Defense of Adversary System
Values, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1377, 1392 (2008) (describing the prospect of “moral activism by
prosecutors” as “chilling”).
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expanding prosecutorial power. There are over twenty-five thousand prosecutors
spread across the country.274 A growing, but ill-defined sense that prosecutors
not only can, but should, bend the laws to further individual conceptions of
justice will not be limited to certain prosecutors.275 It will benefit unreasonable
prosecutors, corrupt prosecutors, benevolent prosecutors, and everyone in
between.
Relatedly, voters might heed the call to pay more attention to prosecutorial
discretion, but do so to endorse severity rather than lenience. Even in a time of
enhanced attention to mass incarceration, populist reactions often favor
increased severity.276 Prosecutors finely attuned to community sentiment and,
more precisely, electoral approval may prove disastrous for vulnerable
defendants and victims.277 The emerging wave of progressive prosecutors, then,
generates an opportunity for crafting a theory of prosecution, while
simultaneously highlighting the urgent need for some theoretical foundation in
which to ground the prosecutorial role.
By tying reforms to a servant-of-the-law paradigm, reform prosecutors also
limit the prospect of backlash.278 A servant-of-the-law orientation folds
prosecutors into the underlying mission of the criminal justice system, rather
than asking them to override the actions of other powerful actors—even if the
ultimate outcome remains the same. One explanation for legislatures’ general
indulgence of prosecutorial power over the years is that prosecutors have acted
in ways that legislators endorse. If that changes, legislatures may respond. This
is a common pattern in other areas, such as gun regulation, where “pro-gun” state
legislatures jumped to override “pro-gun-control” localities that strayed from
state-wide policy preferences.279 Another example comes from the not-toodistant past. Just as legislatures sought to rein in lenient judges through

274. Perry & Banks, supra note 44 (“The nearly 25,000 FTE assistant prosecutors employed in
2007 represented a 7% increase from the number reported in 2001.”).
275. See Harris, supra note 254 (advocating that prosecutors “stop coloring within the lines of
our unjust, unfair and unrealistic systems of justice”).
276. See RACHEL ELISE BARKOW, PRISONERS OF POLITICS 5–6 (2019) (chronicling a
“pathological political process that caters to the public’s fears and emotions” that allows reform efforts
to be “derailed with a single story”); John Ehrett, Public Choice and the Mandatory Minimum
Temptation, 35 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 603, 604 (2017) (discussing legislative enactment of new
mandatory minimum sentences in response to lenient sentence given to Brock Turner); Huq, supra note
96, at 1698 (noting that in America, “[p]ublic punitiveness” typically pushes democratic levers to create
“an expansion in criminal liability and harsh, mandatory sentences”).
277. See Sklansky, supra note 255, at 673 (“The danger of politicizing the handling of particular
cases is, in fact, a worrisome aspect of the growing attention voters seem to be paying to prosecutorial
elections.”).
278. See, e.g., Nicole Malliotakis, Progressive Prosecutors’ Pathetic Retreat, N.Y. POST (Feb. 4,
2018),
https://nypost.com/2018/02/04/progressive-prosecutors-pathetic-retreat/
[https://perma.cc/6WRH-RF3M] (criticizing NYC prosecutors’ declaration that they would not
prosecute turnstile jumpers: “You can now ride the subway for free.”).
279. See Jeffrey Bellin, The Right to Remain Armed, 93 WASH. U.L. REV. 1, 17 (2015)
(describing movement in state legislatures to use state law to “override local gun control preferences” in
cities like Philadelphia, Atlanta, Cleveland, and San Francisco).
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sentencing guidelines,280 legislatures could enact charging or plea bargaining
requirements to respond to prosecutors who appear to be flouting the laws,281 or
just ratchet up severity more generally.282 Or legislators might empower other
actors, such as police or victims, to initiate and prosecute cases themselves.283
In summary, there are reasons to be wary of enhancing the prosecutor’s
freedom to “do justice” as an answer to the system’s failings; that freedom may
be part of the problem. An alternative path to reforming prosecutorial excess can
achieve many of the goals of the current reform movement, while stressing
adherence to the law. A prosecutor zealously serving the law will be less likely
to bend or break existing legal rules by overcharging,284 relying on coercive plea
bargains,285 failing to provide discovery,286 improperly striking jurors,287
maintaining faulty cases,288 engaging in deceptive closing argument,289 and so
on. This model would also support broader cooperation with defense attorneys,
such as open-file discovery, and more transparent plea bargaining and charging
practices. That cooperation would facilitate the innocence-protective roles of
defense attorneys, judges, and juries. Finally, by clarifying lines of
accountability, the servant-of-the-law model will shift the reform focus to other

280. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED
STATES 71-73 (Jeremy Travis et al. eds., 2014) (explaining legislative reaction to perception of lenient
sentences, with mandatory minimum sentences, three strikes laws, and truth in sentencing
requirements).
281. See, e.g., CAL. PEN. CODE § 667(g) (2019) (“Prior serious or violent felony convictions shall
not be used in plea bargaining . . . .”); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.421(6) (2010) (explaining that “in no
instance may the prosecutor agree not to allege prior convictions” as part of a plea agreement).
282. See Michael M. O’Hear, Plea Bargaining and Victims: From Consultation to Guidelines,
91 MARQ. L. REV. 323, 346 (2007) (“Legislators may be trying to use a predictably tough sentencing
system to offset an arbitrarily lenient plea bargaining system.”); Ronald F. Wright, Prosecutorial
Guidelines and the New Terrain in New Jersey, 109 PENN ST. L. REV. 1087, 1093 (2005) (describing
the evolution of New Jersey plea bargaining guidelines).
283. See, e.g., Alexandra Natapoff, When the Police Become Prosecutors, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 26,
2018)
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/26/opinion/police-prosecutors-misdemeanors.html
[https://perma.cc/Q92E-8THD] (“In hundreds of misdemeanor courts in at least 14 states, police officers
can file criminal charges and handle court cases, acting as prosecutor as well as witness and
negotiator.”); cf. Luke Broadwater, Gov. Hogan Calls on Attorney General Frosh to Prosecute More
Baltimore Criminal Cases, Slams City Prosecutors, BALT. SUN (Sep. 18, 2019),
https://www.baltimoresun.com/politics/bs-md-pol-hogan-frosh-crime-20190918lnr2eps7y5c3lllgloifuczvuu-story.html [https://perma.cc/7BHM-RDC5] (reporting on efforts to transfer
prosecuting authority from progressive prosecutor to other officials); Akela Lacy & Ryan Grim,
Pennsylvania Lawmakers Move to Strip Reformist Prosecutor Larry Krasner of Authority, THE
INTERCEPT (July 8, 2019), https://theintercept.com/2019/07/08/da-larry-krasner-pennsylvania-attorneygeneral/ [https://perma.cc/Z27N-JU6A] (same).
284. See supra Part II.B.
285. See supra Part II.C.
286. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86 (1963) (holding that a prosecutor must disclose
material exculpatory information).
287. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986) (“[T]he Equal Protection Clause forbids the
prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely on account of their race . . . .”).
288. See supra Part II.A.
289. See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 82–88 (1935) (reversing conviction based on
improper statements in prosecutor’s closing argument).
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actors with more mature capacities to enact lasting changes, like legislators,
judges, and police.
CONCLUSION
While there is abundant criticism of prosecutors, there is no coherent
normative theory of the role prosecutors should play in our criminal justice
system. We tell prosecutors to “do justice” and hope for the best. The resulting
dissatisfaction with prosecutorial behavior should come as no surprise.
A meaningful theory of how prosecutors should behave is particularly
important at a moment when the country has finally woken up to mass
incarceration.290 With millions under correctional supervision, dropping crime
rates, and a bipartisan desire for change, we stand at the precipice of true criminal
justice reform.291 Many academics and activists look to prosecutors as drivers of
that reform. Indeed, some of the harshest critics of prosecutors’ vast discretion
seek to repurpose prosecutorial power to revolutionize American justice.292 But
in a nation populated by thousands of prosecutors with widely divergent
viewpoints, unbounded prosecutorial discretion to “do justice” will always be a
many-edged sword. And as this Article explains, we need not turn over the keys
to the justice system to prosecutors to achieve reform. Instead, there are clear
benefits to reorienting prosecutors as non-adversarial, servants of the law. By
cooperating with other criminal justice actors—particularly defense counsel—to
enforce defendant-protective rules, prosecutors could help those actors fulfill
their roles in combating injustice. And prosecutors could still dismiss cases and
avoid mindless severity in service of the law. Finally, narrowing the role of the
prosecutor under a servant-of-the-law model could redirect the focus of reform
toward other actors in the criminal justice system, and the system as a whole, to
ensure “that justice shall be done.”293

290. See Kimberlé W. Crenshaw, From Private Violence to Mass Incarceration: Thinking
Intersectionally About Women, Race, and Social Control, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1418, 1421 (2012)
(“Michelle Alexander’s widely discussed The New Jim Crow has provided a popular framing of the
problem that has galvanized a critical mass of the population that may finally be willing to listen.”).
291. See Barack Obama, The President’s Role in Advancing Criminal Justice Reform, 130 HARV.
L. REV. 811, 817 (2017) (“There is a growing consensus across the U.S. political spectrum that the extent
of incarceration in the United States is not just unnecessary but also unsustainable.”).
292. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 33, at 1070–77 (attributing the problem of mass incarceration,
in part, to prosecutorial discretion in charging, plea bargaining, and sentencing); id. at 1085
(“Prosecutors have played a significant role in creating the crisis of mass incarceration, and they have
an ethical duty to do whatever they can to fix it.”).
293. Berger, 295 U.S. at 88.

